















The Thesis Committee for Zachary Koenig Dyer 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 














Kurt G. Weyland 












Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts 
 
 






Extracting Identity: Universal Social Policy in Post-Neoliberal Bolivia 
 
Zachary Koenig Dyer, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Kurt Weyland  
Examinations of social policy often focus on their economic and social outcomes 
without much concern for their political dimensions. Since Evo Morales assumed the 
presidency of Bolivia in 2006, the Andean country has emerged as a powerful example of 
how social policy can be leveraged for political purposes beyond clientelism. The 
government’s famous nationalization of natural gas resources along with a hefty 
hydrocarbon tax funded two major social programs: the Bono Juancito Pinto, an 
education conditional cash transfer, and Renta Dignidad, a universal old-age pension. 
Evidence from surveys, key informant interviews, reports, and official documents 
demonstrated that Bolivia’s universal social policy was motivated by more than the goal 
of efficiently addressing the country’s chronic social inequality. The Morales 
administration’s implementation of these programs was a conscious decision to leverage 
windfall resource rents to build greater national solidarity and advance the MAS’ political 
project to refound the country. Through a universalist approach to social policy, the MAS 
government has consolidated political hegemony, strengthened national solidarity, and 
secured the support of the armed forces. This political strategy, however, rests on shaky 
 v 
ground. The rentier model the government depends on to fund universal social policy 
fuels social conflicts that could destabilize the MAS’ recently won hegemony and its 
attempts at nation building.  
Bolivia’s experience with universal cash transfers lays the foundation for future 
study of social policy and nation building in the developing world; it is also important to 
examine how funding sources impact the efficacy of these programs. Considering cash 
transfers’ exploding popularity and dissemination across the world in the last decade, this 
thesis calls for the more nuanced study of these programs in their political dimensions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The 21st century has been a boom for the left in South America. After decades of 
right-wing governments and adherence to the Washington Consensus, South America 
elected a “pink tide” of leftist governments that began to assert greater control over their 
countries’ natural resources (Media Accuracy on Latin America, 2007). In a wave of 
resource nationalism over the last decade, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
raised taxes and either partially or completely nationalized their hydrocarbon resources 
(Flintoff, 2012). Bolivia, one of the most aggressive pursuers of neoliberal policy during 
the 1980s and 1990s, abruptly reversed course in 2005 when Evo Morales, leader of the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, was elected president. On May 1, 2006, Morales 
made headlines around the world when he dramatically announced the nationalization of 
the hydrocarbon sector and ordered the military to occupy the gas fields. Bolivia 
nationalized its resources on the grounds that they should benefit the public, not private 
corporations. This post-neoliberal model of funding expansive national social policy with 
rents from natural resource development has come to be known as “neo” or “progressive” 
extractivism (Gudynas, 2010).    
Since nationalization, there has been much discussion over how the government 
redistributes natural gas rents. Many studies focus on the social movements that 
influenced the demand for nationalization (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009; Perreault, 2006; 
Kohl, 2002) or the legalese of Law 3058, the law that asserted state ownership over the 
hydrocarbons (Velasquez-Donaldson, 2007; Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008). Hidden inside 
these studies of resource nationalism and nationalization are brief mentions of the social 
programs funded by natural resource rents in Bolivia that have been largely overlooked: 
Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP), an early childhood education conditional cash transfer, and 
Renta Dignidad, a non-contributory old-age pension. Compared to larger, more famous 
programs in Mexico or Brazil, and smaller pilot programs in Honduras or Nicaragua, few 
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studies include Bolivia’s direct cash transfers in their reviews. Despite the vast literature 
on Bolivia’s nationalization, there has been very little study of the government’s decision 
to redistribute resource wealth through cash transfers. Why have Bolivia’s resource-
funded social programs been overlooked?  
Social policy has political dimensions beyond its issue-driven focus. Previous 
studies overlook social policy like BJP and Renta Dignidad because they are perceived as 
byproducts of increased resource revenues. These programs, however, are not 
afterthoughts but important links in the MAS’ resource-nationalist discourse.  Calls for 
redistribution are not answered by nationalization alone; they require social programs to 
channel resource revenues to the public. As programs funded by natural resource rents, 
these cash transfers reflect the rhetoric of resource nationalism and redistribution. This is 
most clearly seen in their unique universalism. Compared to many conditional cash 
transfers in Latin America, these programs do not have targeting mechanisms or means 
tests that limit the eligibility of groups based on income level, ethnicity, or geography.  
Universal redistribution seems odd from a social policy perspective where studies 
suggest targeting measures have greater potential to fight poverty and achieve program 
goals (Handa & Davis, 2006; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). It does make good sense 
politically, however, considering the discourse of resource nationalism where all citizens 
are to benefit from resource wealth. As universal cash transfers funded by nationalized 
resources, BJP and Renta Dignidad are the vehicles by which Bolivians enjoy the shared 
benefits of the country’s resource wealth.    
This thesis seeks to understand and answer the following questions: Why did the 
Morales administration decide to redistribute resource rents through BJP and Renta 
Dignidad? What are the political dimensions to these programs? This thesis limits the 
scope of political dimensions to how social policy builds political support and undercuts 
the opposition, as well as structures society to advance the MAS’ broader political 
project. Finally, what are the limits to this kind of resource-led social policy? It is my 
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hope that these answers will elevate the discussion of universal social policy in post-
neoliberal Bolivia.  
Three main points take shape after examining these social programs from a 
political perspective. First, the government’s decision to forgo means test and other 
limitations on eligibility for BJP and Renta Dignidad is significant. These programs’ 
universalism unites Bolivians under the discourse of resource nationalism that says all 
Bolivians should benefit from natural resource development. Citizenship then is (in part) 
established by sharing the benefits of the country’s natural resources, namely natural gas. 
Universalism manifested in these programs was a MAS strategy to build national 
solidarity and cement the loose coalition of Bolivians that formed in response to 
neoliberal reforms. This physical demonstration of collective social benefits is especially 
important for nation building in Bolivia where regional cleavages and weak nationalism 
have long divided the country. 
Second, cash transfers addressed immediate political concerns as well as larger, 
more strategic ones. Quick rollout of both programs after Morales took office allowed the 
government to make good on its promises to redistribute resource wealth and consolidate 
its political base. Social policy also helped secure the support of the military following 
nationalization. Bolivia is no stranger to military coups so insuring the support of the 
military early in Morales’ presidency was essential. Along with the assignment to protect 
the country’s natural resources, the military became involved in the administration of 
resource-funded social policy, tightening bonds between the MAS central government 
and the armed forces. These immediate considerations helped the MAS stay in power in 
the shaky period following the 2005 election.  
Third, the funding structure behind universal social policy in Bolivia impacts its 
political efficacy. Progressive extractivism has been the cornerstone of the MAS 
government’s ability to expand the material benefits of resource development across 
Bolivia. Aggressive expansion of resource development and the shift toward a rentier 
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economy, however, have exacerbated regional conflicts. These conflicts perpetuate 
regional or ethnic identities, working against universal social policy’s goal of fostering 
national solidarity.  
This thesis will explore these three main ideas over four chapters. Chapter 2 
reviews the theory of universal social policy in welfare states with a particular focus on 
its history of bridging class and territorial differences in fractious societies. There, I will 
argue for the importance of expanding the current focus of welfare state studies on 
Western cases into Latin America, along with a discussion of cash transfers as a form of 
universal social policy and nation building in the developing world. Chapter 3 examines 
BJP and Renta Dignidad from an issue-driven perspective. Focusing on their ability to 
meet their stated goals, I will explore their history, design, and impact on recipients. In 
Chapter 4, I will demonstrate specifically the political uses of these programs. Starting 
with a discussion of their ability to quickly address voter demands and build solidarity 
across class and regional lines, I will then detail how these programs helped secure the 
support of the armed forces and undercut regional opposition.  Finally, in Chapter 5 I will 
explain how the Bolivian government’s choice to fund BJP and Renta Dignidad with a 
rentier economy complicates the unifying goal of universal social policy by reinforcing 
regional identities.   
BACKGROUND  
Bolivia has long struggled with creating an inclusive vision of what it means to be 
“Bolivian.” The colonial legacy created two Bolivias: an elite, urban, white Bolivia with 
strong ties to the global market through extractive industries like mining; and another, 
largely indigenous Bolivia based on subsistence farming and remittances from migratory 
labor that was kept on the periphery of the modern, liberal conception of the Andean 
nation (Kohl, 2002; Klein, 2011). Geographically, Bolivia is today generally divided 
between the indigenous, poor, Andean western highlands and the more prosperous 
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Amazonian eastern lowlands, known as the Media Luna for the half-moon shape the 
departments make on a map.1 Economically, the Andean departments are largely 
dependent on mining and subsistence agriculture. The Media Luna region is more 
commercial and tied to foreign investment with successful large-scale soy and cattle 
operations, the country’s financial center in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and, of course, 
natural gas. The resulting ethnic, cultural, geographic, and economic differences 
contribute to a stronger sense of community and belonging at the regional level with a 
weak sense of national identity (Albó, 2008).  
The Chaco War with Paraguay from 1932 to 1935 is commonly credited as the 
starting point of Bolivian nationalism (Toranzo Roca, 2008) (Harten, 2011; Toranzo 
Roca, 2008) (Harten, 2011; Toranzo Roca, 2008). The war mobilization created a shared 
sense of nationhood as fighters from across the country had to define what the Bolivia 
they were fighting for was. Bolivia’s defeat in the war delegitimized the oligarchs that 
ruled the country and created a shared sense of despair and humiliation across the 
country. This was the starting point for “a collective recognition of being equal with a 
shared frustration at socio-economic marginalization and political subjugation” that 
would position nationalism as an oppositional, middle class movement (Harten, 2011, p. 
19). German Busch, one of the first nationalist leaders following the Chaco War, 
nationalized the Standard Oil Company’s assets in Bolivia when he came to power in 
1937 (Velasquez-Donaldson, 2007).  
The 1952 revolution ushered in the golden age of Bolivian nationalism. Under the 
leadership of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the new government 
set out to unite different interests in a multi-class alliance against a common enemy in the 
feudal, colonial elites (Gray Molina, 2008). One way the MNR set out to build this multi-
class alliance was through nationalizations and increased state control of natural 
                                                
1 While the eastern lowlands are more mestizo in its make-up than the Andean departments, there are still 
large indigenous populations there.  
2 The IDH is responsible for the lion’s share of the central government’s natural 
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resources. The MNR’s nationalist rhetoric lumped feudal elites and the colonial model of 
extraction together to provide a rallying cry to “refound the nation” for the rural peasants 
and middle class brought together by the aftermath of the Chaco War (Harten, 2011, p. 
20). While the MNR tried to implement a “revolutionary nationalism” that would unite 
all Bolivian under a shared national identity, language, and culture, the project ultimately 
failed. A lack of infrastructure to connect the population through transportation and mass 
education hampered literacy and the ability to share in a common culture (indeed, even a 
common language in many rural parts of Bolivia) (Toranzo Roca, 2008).    
Jumping ahead to the 1980’s, Bolivia was faced with another crisis that would 
eventually lead to the rise of the MAS and a new opportunity to refound the Bolivian 
nation. Like many countries in Latin America, Bolivia experienced a “lost decade” in the 
1980’s, characterized by massive foreign debt, economic instability, and hyperinflation. 
Servicing the foreign debt rose from 28.9 percent of export value in 1980 to 39.5 percent 
in 1984. Foreign debt levels sparked hyperinflation that reached as high as 11,850 percent 
in 1985 (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009).   
Convinced that the severity of the crisis facing the country demanded equally 
severe action, then Planning Minister Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (of the MNR) 
followed the advice of Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs and other North American 
advisers in implementing a harsh austerity program (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009; Klein, 
2011). In 1985, the government dramatically cut spending on health, social and education 
services, and froze public sector wages. Reforms brought increased profits and efficiency 
but at the cost of thousands of public sector jobs (Kohl, 2002). With the closing of state-
owned mines and other businesses, unemployment exceeded 20 percent and 
underemployment rose to 50 percent in 1986 (Klein, 2011). Neoliberal reforms directed 
65 percent of revenues of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the state 
hydrocarbon company, to paying down the country’s massive debt. The result starved the 
state-owned company of capital to reinvest and maintain production levels, reasons that 
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would be presented to privatize the company. The reforms curbed hyperinflation but 
failed to produce economic growth.  
The hydrocarbon sector played a key role in the neoliberal reforms. In 1990, the 
Bolivian state passed the Law of Investment and Law of Hydrocarbons 1194. These 
policies opened the hydrocarbon sector to external investment and aimed to attract 
foreign investment by setting up joint ventures between the state and trans-national 
corporations (Kaup, 2010). In 1994, during Sánchez de Lozada’s first presidency, the 
government passed the Plan de Todos (Plan for Everyone) that included the Law of 
Capitalization. In 1996, YPFB was privatized and sold off to foreign national and private 
oil and gas companies (Kaup, 2010; von der Heydt-Coca, 2009). YPFB withdrew from 
active exploration, production, and transportation of oil and natural gas and employment 
dropped from 6,000 to 2,000 employees (Klein, 2011).  
In order to spur greater foreign investment following the Law of Capitalization, 
the state reduced its cut of natural gas royalties from 50 percent to 18, some of the lowest 
in the world (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009). Over the following decade, investment 
increased in Bolivia’s natural gas sector to $3.435 billion in 2005 (Kaup, 2010). 
Exploration during this time increased proven and probable gas reserves from 5.69 
trillion cubic feet (TCF) in 1997 to a peak of 54.86 TCF in 2003 (Kaup, 2010), the 
second largest reserves in Latin America. Natural gas promised to be Bolivia’s golden 
goose, a boon that would transform South America’s poorest country into a modern 
economy and a regional energy hub.  
 Despite the high hopes for neoliberal reforms, Bolivia’s GDP grew only 1.25 
percent per year from 1985 to 1995 (The World Bank, 2012). Instead, the Andean 
country suffered great social costs. In 1997, the price of liquid natural gas (LNG), 
cooking fuel for many urban Bolivians, electricity, water, gasoline and diesel all rose as 
basic services were privatized and subsidies cut (Kohl, 2002). Eduardo Silva (2009) notes 
that neoliberal reforms simultaneously affected economic, political, and social spheres, 
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threatening a wide gamut of Bolivian society ranging from popular sectors and 
indigenous folks, to the middle class. This broad vulnerability to neoliberal reforms laid 
the foundation for diverse socio-economic groups to rally around a common cause, what 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), Evo Morales’ political party, would call a return to 
“sovereignty and dignity” for Bolivia after decades of poor growth and unfavorable 
experiences with foreign investment. The experience mirrors the nationalistic effects of 
the Chaco War by uniting Bolivians around a shared experience of economic 
marginalization and political turmoil. The wide-ranging vulnerability to neoliberal 
reforms and dissatisfaction with the privatization of YPFB would soon swell into massive 
protests that would paralyze the country. 
The early 2000s were a turbulent time for Bolivia. Two major protest movements 
centered on the privatization of natural resources manifested a growing national 
frustration with neoliberal reforms and the overall direction of the country. In 2000, 
residents in Cochabamba protested the privatization of municipal and cooperative water 
utilities to a subsidiary of the U.S. engineering giant Bechtel, and the coinciding 200 
percent rate hike. The “Water War” that followed mobilized thousands of local Bolivians 
against the privatization. The military was deployed to quell the demonstrations and one 
person was killed, but the protesters’ demands were met and another pending water utility 
privatization in El Alto, a fast growing and largely indigenous city outside the capital, La 
Paz, was canceled (Klein, 2011).  
While the Water War was essentially a regional conflict, the 2003 “Gas War” 
took resource nationalism to the national stage (Perreault, 2006). In 2003, the Bolivian 
government, led by President Sánchez de Lozada during his second presidency, 
organized a consortium named Pacific LNG to export the country’s natural gas to 
California and Mexico. The cheapest, most direct route for the pipeline led through Chile, 
which had seized Bolivia’s only coastline during the War of the Pacific in 1883. The plan 
to export gas through Chile to the United States and the global market reinforced cultural 
 
 9 
tropes of foreign exploitation that resonated across the country  (Perreault, 2006). In 
September 2003, protesters demanded the pipeline pass through Peru instead. 
As the protests escalated, so did the violence. Tensions reached a boiling point on 
October 13, 2003, when over 20 unarmed protesters were killed in El Alto manning a 
barricade (Klein, 2011). Martial law was declared and demands radicalized. Protesters, 
mostly in the strongly indigenous departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, and Chuquisaca, 
expanded their demands to include the nationalization of the natural gas industry and 
other strategic sectors, the convocation of a revolutionary constituent assembly, an end to 
racist colonial relations inside Bolivia, and a radical redistribution of land and wealth 
(Webber, 2010). The collection of demands came to be known as the October Agenda, 
named after October 2003, when the Gas War took place.  
Political pressure on Sánchez de Lozada continued to mount following the 
violence. Cabinet ministers resigned in protest over the use of violent force to quell the 
demonstrations. The military withdrew its support of the president. On October 17, 2003, 
Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled to Miami. Vice President Carlos Mesa was sworn in 
as president of Bolivia and promised to hold a referendum on the future of Bolivia’s 
natural gas.  
After refusing to act on the July 2004 referendum where voters called for the 
nationalization of the natural gas sector, the Mesa administration oversaw the passing of 
the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) in 2005, an incomplete attempt to address 
protesters’ concerns over natural gas revenues (Perreault, 2006). Hastily passed, the IDH 
has been criticized for its heavy bias towards gas-producing and sparsely populated 
departments—notably in the Media Luna—over larger, more indigenous, and poorer 
departments in the western highlands. The Media Luna receives 30 percent of 
hydrocarbon revenues compared to 19.7 percent for the remaining five departments, 
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despite the fact that the remaining departments have a population 79 percent greater than 
that of the Media Luna(Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008).2  
Continued pressure from social movements forced Mesa to resign. Eduardo 
Rodríguez, then chief justice of the Bolivian Supreme Court, briefly assumed the 
presidency until elections could be held in 2005. Evo Morales won the presidency in a 
landslide, taking 54 percent of the vote (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009).   
NATIONALIZATION AND REDISTRIBUTION  
Morales’ election as the first militant indigenous president in Latin America 
signaled a sea change in Bolivian politics. Broad participation across different cultural, 
social, economic, and ethnic groups cleared the way for sweeping change. The October 
Agenda’s priorities of resource nationalism and redistribution would have a critical role 
in framing the new government’s approach to using social policy to build national 
solidarity and address practical political concerns.  
In January 2006, the MAS outlined their National Development Plan (NDP), the 
party’s goals for Bolivia following Morales’ election. In the NDP’s introduction, the 
authors write, “The primary objective is the suppression of the causes of inequality and 
social exclusion in the country, which is to say to change the pattern of raw material 
exports and its foundations of colonialism and neoliberalism” (Translation mine, 
Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006). The NDP goes on to call for the 
redistribution of national wealth to benefit sectors of society traditionally excluded from 
the means of production and “dignified” employment. In order to achieve this new model 
of development the authors call for the growth and diversification of the economy, the 
recuperation of the domestic market, and, finally, the redefinition of Bolivia’s 
                                                
2 The IDH is responsible for the lion’s share of the central government’s natural 
gas revenues, even after nationalization.  
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relationship with the global economy. Morales soon grabbed headlines around the world 
when he addressed this final point by nationalizing the hydrocarbon sector.  
Despite Morales’ flamboyant occupation, the new president had to tread carefully 
with his nationalization plans. With YPFB a shadow of its former self, Morales had to 
strike a balance between fulfilling the public’s demands for greater control over the 
country’s resources with the private corporations it depended on to keep the economy 
going. The resulting agreement re-established the state as the owner of Bolivia’s natural 
resources while retaining a prominent place for foreign operators in the hydrocarbon 
sector. Royalties were returned to their pre-1985 levels at 50 percent and some were 
temporarily increased to 82 percent to fund the re-establishment of YPFB (Kaup, 2010). 
Despite the government’s drastic increase in taxes and royalties, many companies stayed 
because they continued enjoying profits thanks to the high demand for natural gas 
(Rochlin, 2007). While the Bolivian government owns the gas at the wellhead, 
transnational corporations still dominate the Bolivian gas fields. Petrobras, Repsol and 
British Gas are responsible for almost 80 percent of the country’s total output, with 
YPFB covering the remaining 20 percent in partnership with foreign companies (Cambio, 
2011). The move increased the Bolivian state’s revenues from oil and natural gas from 
$300 million in 2005 to $1.6 billion in 2007 (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009).   
Following the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector, the government quickly 
addressed the October Agenda’s call to use the nation’s resource wealth for its own 
development. In November 2006, it launched an education conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) called the Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP)3 granting Bolivian students 200 bolivianos 
(approximately US$28) a year to fight school desertion. Transfers from YPFB and the 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), the state-owned mining company, fund 
BJP. A year later, in 2007, Morales introduced Renta Dignidad, a direct cash transfer 
                                                
3 Bono Juancito Pinto was modeled after a similar, smaller municipal program in the city of El Alto, La 
Paz, Bono Esperanza.  
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designed as a universal pension for all Bolivians over 60 years of age of 1,200 bolivianos 
(approximately $173) annually for citizens with a retirement plan and 2,400 bolivianos 
(approximately $347) each year for those without (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2010). Renta 
Dignidad is directly funded by the IDH. Together, these cash transfers cover 23.8 percent 
of the population (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, 2011).4  
Both of these cash transfers stand out for their universal eligibility. Unlike many 
cash transfers in Latin America (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009), BJP has no means test or 
geographic, gender, or ethnic limitations on eligibility. All Bolivian children attending 
public school are eligible. Renta Dignidad is even more inclusive, open to all Bolivians 
meeting the age requirement without any conditions attached to the transfer. The 
universal eligibility of these programs and their direct connection to politicized natural 
resources (natural gas, mining) demonstrate Bolivia’s attempt to use natural-resource-
funded universal social policy for political purposes that go beyond concerns over 
education and pension benefits.  
In the absence of a strong national identity, the MAS campaigned as the vehicle to 
a new constitution and a new Bolivian nationhood (Harten, 2011). Unlike the MNR 
nationalist movement that sought to unite Bolivians under a single national culture and 
common language, the MAS project of “plurinationalism” wanted to create a socially 
decentralized state that supported a plurality of languages, cultures, political, economic 
and judicial systems (Escobar, 2010).   
The plurinational project, referred to as vivir bien, or living well, in the 2009 
Constitution, seeks to harmonize modern liberal and communitarian forms of 
government, redistributing national wealth to equalize economic opportunities while 
expanding political rights and granting autonomy to indigenous folks (Escobar, 2010). 
This two-headed approach pulls Bolivia in opposing directions: in one direction a 
                                                
4 Based on 2011 population and enrollment data. 
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decentralized country with greater regional autonomy, and in another a burgeoning 
central government reasserting itself after decades of anemic activity in the economy and 
social sector. The question of how to balance traditional liberal and communitarian forms 
of government is something that will take much time and effort. The seemingly opposite 
forms of government lashed together in the Constitution might even lead to the eventual 
dissolution of the Bolivian nation-state. It is clear, however, that the MAS does not intend 
for the central government to wash away. In the face of greater regional and indigenous 
autonomy in a plurinational country, the role of national social policy to keep these 





Chapter 2: Theory 
 Social policy has political facets that play important roles in a government’s wider 
political project. Much of the scholarship on social policy, understandably, focuses 
policy’s ability to meet its stated goals, be they literacy, poverty alleviation, etc. This 
approach to social policy has obvious practical benefits in crafting ever-more effective 
programs to address society’s ills but ignores social policy’s political dimensions. This 
has certainly been the case with the large body of research on cash transfers in Latin 
America. Any examination of cash transfers beyond their stated goals has narrowly 
focused on their potential to win votes for the government (Sewall, 2008; Layton & 
Smith, 2011; Ansell & Mitchell, 2011). Social policy does play an important role in 
securing voters’ support but its political ends extend beyond clientelism and vote buying 
to articulate a government’s vision for society.  
In a fractious society like Bolivia’s, social policy has the potential to address 
social concerns and play an important role in the government’s political vision for the 
country. One of the most pressing concerns for the MAS government following its rise to 
prominence, was finding a way to cement the loose coalition of Bolivians that formed in 
response to neoliberal reforms. Considering the differences that have historically divided 
Bolivians, social policy plays an important role in the MAS’ attempt at nation building. 
Bolivia’s experience with social policy and nation building takes on a Latin 
American interpretation through the use of cash transfers. Cash transfers constitute one of 
the most successful poverty alleviation and human capital development efforts in Latin 
America and enjoy growing popularity across the developing world (Fiszbein & Schady, 
2009). Including cash transfers in the literature about social policy’s role in nation 
building not only offers greater insight into the political motivations behind the Morales 
administration’s decisions to redistribute natural gas revenues but also a deeper 
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understanding of how social policy can bridge territorial and class divides in the 
developing world.  
A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL POLICY  
 Social policy is often thought of in a narrow, issue-driven focus but outside its 
goals of education reform or old-age poverty lie broader political goals. Governments 
tailor social policy to attract support from specific groups. The shape of these policies 
reflects not only the populations the government covets for political support but also the 
government’s wider vision of how society should be organized. Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism provides a detailed look at the ways 
conservative, liberal, and socialist governments use social policy to structure society.    
 Conservative welfare systems seek to preserve traditional authority (state, church, 
family) and privilege by reinforcing the system they rest on. The conservative model, 
epitomized by the Imperial German state under Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s, divides 
society along occupational lines. This system courts “fraternity based on status identity, 
obligatory and exclusive membership, mutualism, and monopoly of representation” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 60). In its attempt to preserve traditional authority and its 
privileges, this system creates social policy that draws distinct lines between state 
servants, elites, and subjects. While social rights can be generous, they required close 
adherence to societal norms and morals. In exchange for elevated social status via distinct 
benefits, the state receives loyalty and deference from beneficiaries.  
 In contrast, the liberal system fights against traditional power structures, valuing 
the market as the best way to achieve equality and universalism. Liberals viewed 
conservative social policy as an instrument of stratification, creating paternal dependence 
on the state and immoral behavior like idleness. Despite the liberal goals of equality and 
universalism, this system tends to create a dual society of those who can and cannot 
actively participate in the market economy (and therefore provide for their own welfare). 
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Liberal social policy sought to reward entrepreneurialism and self-reliance, and punish 
market failure through punitive and stigmatizing social policy (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 62). Means tests became a popular tool of identifying the truly poor. The resulting 
structure leaves the poor at the bottom, dependent on stigmatized social benefits while the 
middle class and elites rely on the market for their welfare. 
 Esping-Andersen points out that socialists had to cut their own space between 
conservative and liberal systems. While socialists were similar to conservatives in their 
desire to protect labor from the liberal pro-market vision, they were firmly against the 
paternalism of conservative systems. Additionally, socialists opposed the stigmatizing 
means tests commonly used by liberal governments to split the working classes. Instead, 
socialist social policy avoided the divisiveness of conservative and liberal social policy 
by fomenting solidarity through cross-class universalism. Esping-Andersen notes that 
universalism became a guiding principle because it “equalized the status, benefits, and 
the responsibilities of citizenship, and because it helped build political coalitions” (1990, 
p. 68). The socialist model stands out from the previous two by focusing on solidarity 
over stratification.  
The MAS’ approach to redistribution through cash transfers most closely 
resembles socialist tactics of using universal social policy to cultivate solidarity across 
class lines by asserting that all citizens are endowed with universal rights, regardless of 
their class or economic position in society. Socialist governments in Europe sought to 
eliminate means tests and other rules that limited eligibility, breaking down public 
benefits aimed at specific trades, populations, etc. Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 68) notes 
that the socialist notion of solidarity, where a society is dominated by masses of urban 
and rural poor need not be limited to traditionally socialist labor movements since other 
strata of society are also “victims of forces beyond their control, and face poverty and 
basic social risks.” This strategy not only fit the ideological leanings of socialists, but also 
proved an effective tool for building political coalitions.  
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The Bolivian experience with neoliberal reforms mirrors the socialist notion of 
solidarity beyond traditional workers’ movements. Not only is 80 percent of the country 
working in low-productive, low-wage informal sector or subsistence agriculture (Klein, 
2011), but the impact of neoliberal reforms crossed class lines, affecting the middle class 
as well. The wake of neoliberal shocks reminded several sectors of society that they all 
shared the same basic social risks and legitimated calls for radical change in the state’s 
economic and social policies that led to Morales’ election. The divides in Bolivia, 
however, extend beyond class lines. The MAS would have to use universal social policy 
to create a new national identity that crossed class, ethnic, and territorial lines.  
Nations are imagined political communities, inherently limited, and sovereign 
(Anderson, 1991). Created where there were none before, nations are cultural 
constructions that unite different groups of people together in shared camaraderie. Once a 
nation is established though, the cultural processes behind it do not stop. Nations define 
themselves, in part, negatively, establishing whom to include by whom to exclude. Social 
policy becomes an indicator of that inclusion as citizenship. The bonds that tie diverse 
groups together cannot be taken for granted and nationality must be constantly reinforced 
(Boychuk, 2008). Since the first modern welfare state under Otto von Bismarck, social 
policy has proven an effective tool for building solidarity in fractious societies (Banting, 
1995).  
Building off Esping-Andersen’s work, several authors (Banting, 1995; Banting, 
2005; Boychuk, 2008; Béland & Lecours, 2008; Kpessa, Béland, & Lecours, 2011) 
expand the concept of universal social policy from a tool for cross-class solidarity into 
one of nation building inside a country through ethnic and territorial integration. Few 
nations are homogenous cultural bodies and many retain powerful ethnic or territorial 
identities that challenge their nation-state’s dominant narrative of “who we are.” Banting 
(2005) reminds the reader that identity has territorial as well as economic facets. 
Detailing the case of Quebec, a large, industrial state with a distinct cultural, linguistic, 
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and economic identity with panache for secession, Banting explains how universal social 
policy in the form of national healthcare served as a way to unite the Quebecois with the 
rest of Canada. National healthcare manifested the Canadian “imagined community” as 
something that defined Canadian citizenship, connecting the Quebecois directly with the 
federal government and the wider population. National healthcare played a similar role in 
maintaining the loyalty of the Scots to Great Britain during the 20th century (Béland & 
Lecours, 2008).     
Kpessa, Béland, and Lecours (2011) later examine the use of social policy to 
build national unity in the recently independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa, breaking 
with the tendency of previous welfare states studies to focus on industrialized Western 
nations.5 Kpessa et al. (2011) note that even though social policy in developing nations 
may not be as comprehensive as it is in the West, it still plays an important role in nation 
building. The authors argue that social policy in sub-Saharan Africa helped construct a 
sense of national solidarity after independence while promoting economic and social 
development. The resulting social policy aimed at building national—not ethnic—
solidarity with particular significance for mitigating territorial fragmentation.  
The collective ownership of natural gas through the reestablishment of YPFB and 
the IDH awarded all Bolivians a stakeholder position in the development of gas reserves, 
not just regional or private groups. It is upon this right to share in the wealth created by 
the country’s natural gas that Bolivians make claims on their government and, in turn, 
define the boundaries of a shared political community: Bolivian citizens have a right to 
benefit from the development of natural resources. This right to benefit from natural gas 
development is embodied in the BJP and Renta Diginidad’s universal eligibility and 
funding from nationalized resource revenues, tying citizenship (through universal 
eligibility) to natural resources (through the funding of the programs via nationalized 
                                                
5 While this is the general trend, Richard Titmuss conducted a fair bit of cross-national social policy 
research outside the West, including Tanzania and Mauritius.  
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resources and taxes). Even though universal social policy in Bolivia does not reach all 
citizens all the time, the way universal healthcare does in Canada or Great Britain, 
Kpessa et al.’s examples of national social policy in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that 
these limitations do not preclude social policy in the developing world from playing an 
important role in defining a shared political community. In this way, the conception of 
natural gas as a national resource provided the theoretical foundation for the construction 
of national social policy to bridge territorial and class divides.  
Interestingly, the case of Renta Dignidad and the Media Luna demonstrates how 
the financial structure of social policy can be just as important as its symbolic aspects. 
Regional elites in the Media Luna, who were at the center of the neoliberal model’s focus 
on resource development and foreign investment, found themselves isolated from the 
MAS’ new development model and responded with calls for autonomy. Bolivia’s 
hydrocarbon wealth is largely concentrated in the Media Luna,6 a politically hostile 
region for the Morales administration. Despite their favorable treatment under the IDH, 
Media Luna elites were wary of Morales and the MAS’ calls for redistribution and how 
natural gas revenues originating in their region would be used to finance them. Media 
Luna leaders got the central government to agree to hold a referendum in July 2006 on 
autonomy from the central government. The measure would have granted unprecedented 
departmental control over natural resources, the taxes derived from them, and the 
authority to set policy on all regional matters. While the referendum failed at the national 
level, it passed overwhelming in the Media Luna department of Santa Cruz, the nucleus 
of the autonomy movement, with 71 percent voting in favor of autonomy (Eaton, 2007). 
Had departmental autonomy passed, it would have cut off the central government from 
the funding source necessary to carry out the October Agenda’s calls for redistribution 
and collective ownership of natural gas.  
                                                
6 While the Media Luna has been the traditional center of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector, exploration for 
new natural gas wells is under way in the Andean department of La Paz  
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The MAS central government had a strong incentive to maintain control over 
universal social policy. Renta Dignidad offered the central government the opportunity to 
address chronic old-age poverty while building political coalitions in a hostile region 
(Müller, 2009). Mirroring the socialist universalist strategy, Renta Dignidad offers a 
pension to all Bolivians over 60, regardless of their participation in a social security 
scheme through formal employment.7 The pension’s universal eligibility allowed it to 
penetrate the opposition-controlled Media Luna region and help connect citizens there 
with the central government. In 2012 for example, 17.1 percent of Renta Dignidad was 
distributed to Santa Cruz, the epicenter of the conservative autonomous movement 
(Viceministerio de Pensiones y Servicios Financieros , 2012). The pension has also been 
credited with reducing poverty 5.8 percent between 2007 and 2009 (Gonzales, 2011). 
These positive impacts helped reinforce this nascent bond between the departments and 
the national government. Concentrating the management of social policy at the national 
level, the central government develops a direct relationship with all citizens, including 
those in the Media Luna.  
The Media Luna still, however, receives a disproportionate amount of the IDH 
(Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008) and could use these funds to create rival social policy to 
weaken the central government’s ability to build solidarity across territorial differences. 
The Morales administration solved this problem by funding Renta Dignidad out of the 
departments’ IDH allotments. Renta Dignidad, a national old-age pension, is the purview 
of the central government, yet the funding for it comes from each department’s allotment 
of the IDH tax (Müller, 2009). By forcing the department prefectures in the Media Luna 
to pay for the central government’s social policy, the Morales administration undercut its 
political opposition’s ability to use resource revenues against the national solidarity 
project.  
                                                
7 The pension is tiered between those with a pre-existing social security plan they contributed to during 
formal employment and those without, primarily informal workers. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.   
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Social policy not only helps bind departments and regions to the central 
government, it integrates institutions as well. Majority popular support is essential to the 
MAS socialist experiment in Bolivia, but it also depends on a strong, loyal relationship 
with the armed forces (Rochlin, 2007). Leftist leaders in Latin America have often 
struggled against counter-movements supported by the armed forces or outside political 
actors (often the United States), in episodes ranging from the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, to 
Pinochet’s coup d’état against President Salvador Allende, and the Contras in Nicaragua. 
Even Latin America’s more recent shift to the left, starting with Hugo Chávez’s election 
in 1998, has faced violent pushback from the armed forces. Chávez survived a short-lived 
coup attempt in 20028; Honduras’ left-leaning President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a 
coup d’état by the Central American country’s military in 2009; and Ecuador’s President 
Rafael Correa faced a military police strike in 2010 where he was tear-gassed and held 
captive in a hospital (Caselli, 2010).  
Despite these aggressions, the relationship between the military and civilian 
government in leftist Latin American countries is undergoing a transformation. Presidents 
of Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have started to re-define the military’s 
relationship with civilians, emphasizing a greater role in national development. This 
process has reinserted the military into social development arenas it occupied during the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian period of the 1960s and 1970s that were ceded later during the 
neoliberal era (Giacalone, 2005; Roberts, 2007).    
The military has played a major role in Bolivia’s history, including 180 coup 
d’états since independence in 1825. The most recent coups included General Rene 
Barrientos’ 1964 coup against the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement and General 
Hugo Banzer’s military dictatorship that lasted from 1971 to 1978. While Bolivia saw 
flashes of violence in the eastern lowlands leading up the 2007 referendum on autonomy, 
                                                




it is notable that the Bolivian military did not overthrow the democratically elected 
Morales.9 During the neoliberal era, the Bolivian military saw its budgets cut and a 
reduced role in national development. Vice-President Álvaro García Linera went so far as 
to say the military suffered an “existential crisis” since the re-establishment of democracy 
in 1982 (2010, p. 41).  
The MAS’ 2006 NDP presented a new vision for the Bolivian military, leveraging 
its institutional capabilities to defend the country’s natural resources, and improve 
productive and social infrastructure, specifically in the areas of health and education 
(Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006). The MAS government’s use of the 
military to occupy the natural gas fields in 2006 reinforced the military’s symbolic role as 
the defender of the nation’s resources. Furthermore, the government assigned the military 
to distribute BJP and assist with the distribution of Renta Dignidad. These missions 
assigned to the military have also been placed under the office of the president. This 
demonstrates the government’s attempt to use social policy to fold the military into the 
MAS development agenda, securing its loyalty through increased resources and an 
expanded mission in the post-neoliberal era.  
Flush with natural gas royalties and tax revenues, the MAS government sought to 
redistribute wealth across Bolivia to help fortify a shared sense of solidarity and 
consolidate political support following the tumultuous neoliberal era. The broad, loosely 
defined coalition born in the aftershocks of neoliberal reforms created a shared 
experience on which a national identity could be built. Unlike Canadians, Bolivians are 
not symbolically connected through a single, nation-wide social program, like national 
healthcare. Instead, the Morales administration conceptualizes national solidarity through 
the shared benefits of the country’s resource wealth, especially natural gas. Considering 
Bolivia’s struggles with national unity, resource nationalism offered an attractive 
                                                
9 In fact some sources allege that some members of the military supported a coup d’état in 2003 in favor of 
the MAS.  
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alternative to language or ethnicity to unify the country. More importantly, for 
redistribution via cash transfers to contribute to greater solidarity in Bolivia, all sectors of 
society, not just the MAS’ political base, had to benefit from it. Leveraging the powerful 
symbolism behind the natural gas sector, the BJP and Renta Dignidad cash transfers wed 
resources and citizenship in Bolivia, contributing to a shared imagination of what it 
means to be Bolivian (Harten, 2011).  
PROGRESSIVE EXTRACTIVISM AND NATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY  
Bolivia’s experience with neoliberal reforms and its coinciding rejection of this 
market-based model presents an opportunity to see a government try to re-build national 
solidarity through social policy in a post-neoliberal context. While Kpessa et al. highlight 
how neoliberal retrenchment has re-kindled ethnic and territorial identities, Bolivia’s 
decision to fund its universal social policy through resource development—especially 
natural gas—complicates its own goals of consolidating political power and building 
cross-class, cross-territorial solidarity. The nature of natural gas development sparks 
debates over whether national or local concerns should guide the development of 
Bolivia’s natural resource wealth. These conflicts reinforce local identities and interests 
to the detriment of the MAS’ national solidarity project. These conflicts demonstrate how 
funding sources affect the impact of national social policy.  
While the redistribution of wealth from the country’s nonrenewable resources is 
celebrated as a bold break with the previous neoliberal model, progressive extractivism,10 
the model of funding social programs and expanding public services through ever-
growing resource development, retains the harmful externalities of traditional resource 
development, dependence on raw material exports, and foreign direct investment that 
have long plagued Bolivia (Gudynas, 2010; Klein, 2011; Guachalla, 2010). Despite a new 
                                                
10 Bolivia’s policy of progressive extractivism is not an outlier in the region. Both President Chávez in 
Venezuela and Ecuador’s President Correa follow the same pattern of increasing social spending through 
aggressive resource development. See Guachalla, 2010; Gudynas, 2010.  
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model that favors increased redistribution and state control over nonrenewable resources, 
Bolivia under Morales maintains the same extractive pattern of development that has 
defined its economy since colonial times (Wanderley, 2008; Gudynas, 2010). 
Influenced by the demands of social movements in 2003, the MAS resource 
development policy has prioritized national interests over regional ones. Perreault (2006) 
details that social movements, largely in the highlands and cocaleros in Cochabamaba 
were instrumental in the 2003 protests over natural gas, despite their distance from the 
industry and its externalities. Regional elites seeking autonomy were not the only group 
displaced by the ascendant political power of the MAS and highland indigenous social 
movements. Notably, the Guaraní indigenous folk in the gas-rich state of Tarija were 
almost completely excluded from any national discussion on how gas should be 
developed  (Perreault, 2006), despite the fact that they had the most to lose from poor 
extraction practices. The now dominant discourse of gas as a national resource displaces 
local groups’ concerns about extractive industries because the government prioritizes the 
collective stakeholder position of all Bolivians over that of local groups.  
This is one of the central problems with progressive extractivism in Bolivia.11 The 
Morales administration’s ability to fund its universal social policy depends on the 
financial resources that come from natural gas development. Without a reliable flow of 
income from these resources, the central government will be unable to maintain its 
commitments to the public via BJP and Renta Dignidad and would lose legitimacy with 
voters. This pressure to deliver on its commitments leads the government to encourage 
greater resource exploration and development. In 2012, 85 percent of the productive 
investment in Bolivia will be in the hydrocarbon and energy sectors of the economy 
(Vásquez, 2011).   
                                                
11 The other being the dependence on the unsustainable boom-bust cycle that so often accompanies 
commodities like natural gas and minerals.   
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Bolivians have a collective right to benefit from the development of natural gas, 
but in the context of increasing resource development the burdens of that development 
are not borne evenly. Local communities bear the brunt of natural gas development’s 
negative externalities and these externalities can lead to conflicts that pit local 
communities opposed to resource development or the allocation of its revenues against 
the central government. Studies of extractive industries’ impacts on local communities 
show that resource development tends to reinforce local identities over national ones 
(Humphreys Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). Local groups push 
back against national policy that aims to redistribute revenues more evenly across the 
country to maximize their own benefit from the development of profitable resources in 
their region.  
Nowhere is this divide quite so evident as between the central government and 
indigenous communities. While conflicts over resource development and indigenous 
autonomy are hardly new in Bolivia, they persist under the Morales government. 
Morales’ MAS political party started in Cochabama as a principally indigenous political 
party and has a record of supporting many indigenous causes, from plurinationalism to 
autonomy and education reform (Klein, 2011; Harten, 2011). Despite Morales’ strong 
political base among many indigenous folks in Bolivia, his government’s extractivist 
policies have rankled many supporters. Indigenous groups that protest natural gas 
exploration or development on their land have been accused of extorting YPFB by 
obstructing company activities (La Razón, 2009), condemning Bolivia to perpetual 
poverty (Guachalla, 2010), and being the pawns of European and North American 
environmental NGOs (YPFB, 2011). These conflicts, based on geographically specific 
projects that are perceived to threaten traditional livelihoods, drive divisions between the 
MAS and indigenous groups, one of its most loyal constituents.  
These conflicts over resource extraction emphasize local and ethnic identities at 
the cost of national solidarity. Certainly, one’s membership in one community does not 
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necessarily detract from their inclusion in another; identity is not finite. A Bolivian can 
feel solidarity with their ethnic group and still maintain a strong national sense of being 
Bolivian. However, social policy’s ability to bind different groups together across these 
diverse identities is compromised when one group feels the policy is implemented to their 
detriment. Indigenous groups in gas-rich Tarija are not likely to consider the collective 
benefit of gas development for the country when their livelihood is at stake. Gas 
development reinforces ethnic or local identities as they come under threat from an 
extractivist central government. The structure of progressive extractivism, the system that 
makes the political benefits of universal social policy financially possible in the short 
term threatens the MAS’ long-term political project of national unity.  
SUMMARY 
Evo Morales and the MAS wed resource nationalism and universal social policy, 
embodied in direct cash transfers, to attempt to cement the loose coalition of Bolivians 
that formed in response to anemic economic growth and onerous neoliberal policies into 
a shared imagined community to re-found Bolivia as a plurinational country. Regional 
and ethnic identities, and the externalities of resource-led development policies, however, 
continue to pose great challenges for the MAS’ plurinational project and the future 
governance of the Andean nation. The following chapters will explore the design and 
impact of BJP and Renta Dignidad from a policy perspective; the political maneuvers 
executed through universal social policy; and finally, how Bolivia’s specific dependence 
on resource-based funding for BJP and Renta Dignidad work against their political goals 





Chapter 3. Efficacy of Bolivia’s New Cash Transfer Programs 
Cash transfers in post-neoliberal Bolivia take two forms: conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) and universal old-age pensions. CCTs became widespread in Latin 
America after initial success in the 1990s with Mexico’s Oportunidades12 and Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia13. Today, nearly every country in Latin America has some kind of CCT 
(Handa & Davis, 2006; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). These programs typically transfer 
cash to poor households on the condition that families make prescribed investments in the 
human capital of their children. These conditions often demand regular attendance in 
school for young children, and nutrition, vaccinations, or health checkups for pregnant 
mothers depending on the program’s goals. The assumption behind these conditions is 
that poor families either do not understand these behaviors’ “return on investment,” or do 
not have the time or financial means to do so (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, p. 2). Small cash 
transfers are used to incentivize demand for these services by compensating the 
immediate costs (travel, school supplies, etc.) involved in accessing public services.14 
The supply side of the equation is physical infrastructure and services provided by the 
government (clinics, schools, etc.). A World Bank study of CCTs in Latin America 
suggests that they are most effective when both demand and supply-side concerns are 
addressed, e.g. incentivizing school attendance while simultaneously improving the 
physical infrastructure and quality of education (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). The specific 
goals behind CCTs vary from country to country. Bolivia’s BJP aims to fight school 
desertion to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of universal 
primary education.  
After sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America is the most unequal region in the world, 
with an average Gini coefficient of 0.52. Educational inequality in Latin America 
                                                
12 Originally named Progresa 
13 Originally named Bolsa Escola  
14 This is especially the case in rural areas where individuals might have to travel long distances to reach a 
public school or visit a clinic.  
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constitutes a major mechanism of income inequality reproduction (Humberto Lopez & 
Perry, 2008). Bolivia’s school attendance rates and income levels, especially for poor, 
rural, and indigenous populations, reflect this trend (Gray Molina & Yáñez, 2010). 
Improving access to and the quality of primary education is a key step toward addressing 
Bolivia’s Gini score of 0.56315 (World Bank, 2012). 
The kinds of conditions placed on CCTs are often the outcome of a political 
process (Handa & Davis, 2006; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). Conditions can make 
taxpayers and voters more likely to support cash transfers programs if they are perceived 
to go to sectors investing in the education and health (or other social needs) of their 
children. Where this is the case, a society may be unwilling to transfer money to the 
public without some kind of conditions to ensure the recipients are actually spending the 
money on the specific goals of the program. Guarding CCTs against benefit leakage can 
consume large amounts of the program’s resources. Mexico’s Oportunidades for example 
spent 24 percent of its budget in 2000 investigating conditionality compliance (Caldés, 
Coady, & Maluccio, 2004). Reflecting a liberal model of social policy, these CCTs 
temporarily supply financial support to those in need with the understanding that they 
will eventually no longer need public assistance. Bolivia’s CCT, BJP, is unique in its lack 
of a means test and its limited conditions. While the program is conditional upon regular 
attendance at a public primary school, there are no means tests, or targeted eligibility 
requirements based on gender, region, ethnicity, or any other characteristic. BJP’s 
universal eligibility is a direct reflection of Bolivia’s own political economy as defined 
by the redistributive demands of the October Agenda and the MAS government.    
Targeting poor households and improving consumption of public services task 
CCTs with a dual objective: short-term poverty alleviation and long-term human capital 
development (Handa & Davis, 2006). Studies show that BJP has contributed to poverty 
                                                
15 Based on most recent data from 2008 
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reduction albeit by small margins (Jemio, 2006; Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010). After 
only six years, it is not yet possible to assess the impact BJP will have on improving 
Bolivia’s long-term human capital development but the signs are positive (Gray Molina 
& Yáñez, 2010) (Gray Molina & Yáñez, 2010) (Gray Molina & Yáñez, 2010).  
Pensions are staple of Latin American social policy. All three welfare regimes 
Esping-Andersen (1990) describes use them as one of the state’s most important social 
benefits. Universal pensions are especially attractive because they affect everyone: 
everyone will one day (hopefully) grow old and become eligible for this kind of social 
assistance. More so, old-age poverty is a serious problem in Latin America where many 
work in the informal sector and have no access to state-backed social security schemes.   
Before the 1990s, most Latin American countries followed a conservative-style 
pension system operating “a number of schemes targeted at specific occupational groups 
[…] under different eligibility and benefit rules and, in some cases, hiding privileges that 
affected the legitimacy of the system” (Arza, 2008). Pension reform in the 1990s moved 
away from the earnings-based pension scheme to individual private accounts, reducing 
the role of the state in pension administration and facilitating individual savings. While 
Bolivia too followed this wave of pension reform, in 1997 the government bucked the 
trend and implemented the only universal, non-contributory old-age pension in the 
region, Bonosol (Müller, 2009).  
Like conditionality in CCTs, the terms of pension eligibility reflects the 
stratification strategy pursued by the government. Universalism in pensions involves a 
trade off between greater coverage for the poor and supporting groups that do not need 
the pension to meet their basic needs (Barrientos, 2006). While Renta Dignidad and 
Bonosol both contributed to reducing old-age poverty, especially in rural areas 
(Gonzales, 2011; Jemio, 2006; Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010), this factor was not the only 
motivation behind their universalism. By introducing a universal pension in 1997, the 
Sánchez de Lozada administration started the process of conceptualizing social benefits 
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as rights in Bolivia, not merely insurance against poverty. This notion was codified in 
Article 67 of the 2009 Constitution, “The State shall provide an old age pension within 
the framework of full social security, in accordance with the law.”   
BJP and Renta Dignidad both respond to social concerns in Bolivia, especially the 
MDG for primary education and high instances of old-age poverty. While the goals 
themselves are not novel in social policy, the programs’ universal eligibility is. Despite 
the rare instance of two major universalist social programs in the same country, few 
discussions of the MAS’ natural-resource-funded social spending critically examine the 
design and impact of these cash transfers. A careful review of these programs will also 
prime the discussion on the political role of social policy in post-neoliberal Bolivia in the 
following chapter.   
BONO JUANCITO PINTO 
Interviews with informants yielded little in the way of understanding why primary 
education took priority over other social concerns for the Morales administration but the 
program clearly aims to address the universal primary education MDG (F. Fernández, 
personal communication, July 7, 2011; M. Medinaceli, personal communication, June 28, 
2011). The goal of the BJP is to incentivize the entrance, retention, and graduation of 
primary school students (Ministerio de la Presidencia, 2008). Based on a smaller program 
called Bono Esperanza implemented in El Alto, BJP initially targeted school children 
between first and sixth grade. The program soon grew to include students up to eighth 
grade. Public school teachers are tasked with recording and reporting students’ 
attendance, establishing their eligibility to receive the Bs 200 transfer. Most of the BJP 
goes towards school supplies, clothing and shoes (Tapia Huanaco, Murillo Zambrana, & 
Flores Sotomayor, 2011). Fernando Fernández, a representative of the BJP at the 
Bolivian Ministry of Education, reported that the BJP is also used for non-academic 
purposes like contributing to family expenses or debts, and even buying livestock. While 
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implemented by the Ministry of Education, the Bolivian military is tasked with 
distributing the CCT. In 2010, the government spent over US $100 million on BJP and 
reached 1.925 million students in 2011 (CEPAL, 2011).  
Findings  
Findings on the BJP presented here come from the Bolivian government and two 
studies: Medinaceli and Mokrani’s (2010) Impacto de los bonos financiados con la renta 
petrolera (Impact of cash transfers financed by petroleum rents) and the Observatorio 
Social de Políticas Educativas de Bolivia (OSPEB) (Tapia Huanaco, Murillo Zambrana, 
& Flores Sotomayor, 2011). A representative from the BJP program at the Ministry of 
Education, Fernando Fernández, was also interviewed. Medinaceli and Mokrani’s study 
uses Bolivian household surveys up to 200716 to examine the impacts of BJP (and Renta 
Dignidad, see later in this chapter), its ability to reach the poorest Bolivians, and its 
dependence on fluctuating hydrocarbon rents. OSPEB’s study uses a combination of 
quantitative data and qualitative information, especially ethnographic survey data, to 
assess BJP. For the uses of this report, OSPEB describes how students spend the transfer, 
BJP’s positive impact on retaining students and fighting desertion.  
The Bolivian Ministry of Education reports that school desertion rates lowered 
from 6 percent to 1.9 percent since the BJP’s launch in 2006 (Cambio, 2011). Both the 
OSPEB and Medinaceli and Mokrani’s studies agree that BJP reduces school desertion. 
Children age 5 to 15 were more likely to attend school if they received the BJP; lived in 
an urban area; were older; already knew how to read and write; did not work; were part 
of a smaller family; had parents with more education; and, were part of a home with a 
higher per capita income (Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010).  Students receiving the BJP are 
also more likely to stay in school, especially older students approaching eighth grade 
(Tapia Huanaco, Murillo Zambrana, & Flores Sotomayor, 2011).  
                                                
16 2007 was the last time a national household survey was conducted.  
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The picture becomes more complicated, however, when asking if BJP increases 
overall school attendance. OSPEB’s surveys showed that over 50 percent of teachers and 
parents believe that BJP has increased the number of students in school. The Ministry of 
Education reports that school matriculation rates have gone up since the implementation 
of BJP. Government statistics also report that the rolls of the BJP program have increased 
steadily over the last several years from just over 1 million in 2006 to 1.925 million in 
2011. OSPEB, however, notes that increases in the program rolls (as it expanded to cover 
8th graders) and matriculation rates are not sufficient data to show causation between 
receiving the BJP and increasing school attendance. The report is inconclusive on this 
matter. Fernández agreed that there was not enough information to attribute increased 
attendance rates to BJP. 
 Examining the distribution of the BJP across income levels, Medinaceli and 
Mokrani’s study finds that the poorest Bolivians benefit most from BJP. The study also 
shows a slight reduction in extreme poverty for families receiving the transfer. While the 
BJP does not have a targeting mechanism or audit to ensure only the students most at risk 
of desertion receive the CCT, the majority of the funds still reach low-income students. 
One reason is that as income increases wealthy and middle class families are more likely 
to opt out of the public school system, making their children ineligible to receive the BJP 
(Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010). The same study points out that leakage exists but lower-
income groups enjoy the lion’s share of the BJP. Dividing the population into 10 different 
groups based on highest to lowest income, the study shows that the poorest group alone 
received 16.4 percent of the BJP compared to the richest, which received only 3 percent.  
 To contribute to the data provided by these studies and what the government 
already collects, the military has been tasked with collecting data on the recipients of 
BJP, no longer just distributing the transfer (F. Fernández, personal communication, July 




There are many challenges facing the BJP in the future. One of the biggest is the 
question of whether or not universal transfers are the best way to address the program’s 
goals of improving school retention rates. Since the BJP is universal, there was no push 
to conduct a control group or initial impact study to understand how the CCT would 
affect different families (Gray Molina & Yáñez, 2010). While the BJP has had positive 
impacts for urban students, rural students are the ones facing the greatest gap in access to 
education. Without targeting mechanisms to focus funds towards these students or 
supplementary funding to improve access to schools, the students who the government 
most needs to reach will remain out of range. Also, Bs 200 might not be sufficient 
encouragement to overcome the specific hurdles these populations face.  
While the MDG focus on universal primary education, perhaps Bolivia would get 
a better return by focusing on older students. The NDP dedicates an entire section to the 
challenges facing education in Bolivia. The plan notes that 91.4 percent of children from 
six to 14 years of age regularly attend school while only 54.5 percent of students 15 to 19 
years of age do (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006). While the NDP states 
that these populations require special attention to lower desertion rates, the group most 
likely to abandon school—15 to 19-year-old students—is not eligible for the BJP. The 
educational rate of return climbs quickly for students with more than 12 years of 
schooling but the current bounds of the CCT do not encourage older children to continue 
their education (Gray Molina & Yáñez, 2010).  
BJP’s singular focus on school attendance rates is also unique in the region. 
Countries like Chile and Brazil have a more development-oriented approach to their 
education CCTs where funds are distributed based on retention rate and improved test 
scores (Tapia Huanaco, Murillo Zambrana, & Flores Sotomayor, 2011). Studies of CCTs 
elsewhere in Latin America suggest that they are most effective when the cash transfer 
addresses the demand side by encouraging students to attend school while simultaneously 
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addressing the supply side through improved quality of education (Humberto Lopez & 
Perry, 2008). Under the current funding allocation for the BJP, there is no additional 
funding for more teachers or more schools to accommodate the desired increase in 
student enrollment (Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010). While there have been advancements 
in plurinational education in the form of communities having greater say over what their 
students learn and the languages spoken in the classroom, there have not been large 
efforts to reform the rigor of instruction.  
Beyond the confines of BJP’s criteria and design there are several factors that 
influence the efficacy of the CCT. The lack of official poverty data for Bolivia makes it 
difficult to gauge the accuracy of BJP’s effects on the families that receive it. 2007 was 
the last year the Bolivian government conducted an official household survey. Based on 
prices in department capital cities, the Bolivian National Statistical Institute (INE) 
suggests that poverty fell from 59.63 percent in 2005 to 51.31 percent in 2009 (2011). 
While this data is encouraging, INE’s estimates have not been verified with a national 
household survey and outside groups like the World Bank do not acknowledge them. 
Since BJP launched in 2006, the program rolls have nearly doubled along with the 
program’s budget. This leaves only one year of data to gauge the program’s effects on 
poverty alleviation. While this is admittedly a secondary goal of the program, studies like 
Medinaceli and Mokrani’s would greatly benefit from more recent data. This would also 
aid the study of the program’s political effects by measuring the financial impact of the 
program on recipient households.  
Besides the lack of official data on the impacts of the BJP, the CCT also faces the 
vagaries of government funding. BJP does not have a fixed annual budget from the 
central government. Instead, it is funded through annual transfers from YPFB and the 
state-owned mining corporation, COMIBOL. If there is not enough liquidity in these 
state-owned enterprises to meet the BJP’s obligations for that year, the National Treasury 
steps in to fill the gap. Fernández said the lack of a fixed budget hinders BJP’s 
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administrators from being able to plan beyond the current fiscal year, never knowing if or 
when the funding might end.  
Inconsistent funding for BJP is symptomatic of the government’s lack of vision 
for the CCT. Fernández argued that the BJP has little independence to set its own agenda. 
He went on to say that the CCT was under-utilized. Fernández argued that by narrowly 
focusing on retention rates BJP ignored a more holistic approach to solving educational 
inequality in Bolivia.  In particular, Fernández noted that BJP did not partner with anti-
child labor efforts. Findings from school surveys on attendance noted that children who 
did not work were more likely to attend classes. At the time of the interview, in July 
2012, BJP was just starting to partner with initiatives to address child labor. All of these 
hurdles reinforce Fernández’s belief that there is no long-term plan for the CCT. The lack 
of imagination for what BJP can be outside directly redistributing money to school 
children limits the CCT’s ability to contribute to social and economic development in 
Bolivia.  
RENTA DIGNIDAD  
Old-age poverty is a critical issue in Bolivia. In 2003, Bolivians over the age of 
60 had a poverty rate of 63 percent versus the national average of 58.6 percent. That same 
year, only one percent of rural elderly were living above the poverty line (Müller, 2009). 
Motivated in part by this problem, Bolivia launched Bono Solidario or Bonosol in 1997. 
While Bolivia had a social security scheme in place before the Bonosol, many elderly 
Bolivians were ineligible for it because they worked in the informal sector or had long 
periods of unemployment. Since the Bonosol was first implemented, benefits to elderly 
Bolivians have ebbed and flowed as different programs cut and expanded the payout and 
modified eligibility requirements. Morales’ Renta Dignidad, the third iteration of the 
universal pension system, is the most generous to date and is credited with greatly 
diminishing the rate of extreme poverty in Bolivia (Gonzales, 2011).  
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The Bonosol provided cash transfers of $248 annually to citizens over 65 years 
old. Arguably, the Bonosol was more concerned with political than social goals. Funded 
by dividends paid out by privatized state-owned enterprises, the Bonosol was designed to 
create domestic stakeholders to support Sánchez de Lozada’s unpopular neoliberal 
reforms, including the privatization of YPFB (Müller, 2009). Under the scheme, the 
largest corporations were turned into joint-stock companies where the state retained 
minority shares while allowing foreign capital investments (Ministerio de Planificación 
del Desarrollo, 2006). The Bonosol could not be called a truly universal pension scheme, 
however, considering that the provision limited eligibility to Bolivians who were over the 
age of 21 by December 1995. Under this scenario, the program would have ceased to 
exist after the last of these beneficiaries passed away (Gonzales, 2011).  
The economic stability of the cash transfer was constantly under debate as year 
after year dividends from the privatized funds failed to meet the program’s obligations. 
Under Presidents Hugo Banzer and Jorge Quiroga, between 1998 and 2001, the Bonosol 
was replaced with a new, reduced benefit called the Bolivida. The Bolivida limited the 
group of beneficiaries to Bolivians over the age of 50 by 1995 and lowered the benefit to 
between $56 and $60 a year. In 2002, Sánchez de Lozada, recently reelected, reinstated 
the Bonosol at its original eligibility and payout. Concerns over the pension’s 
sustainability never disappeared, however, and when Morales nationalized the 
hydrocarbon sector all private shares from the capitalization fund returned back to the 
state, bankrupting the pension.  
While it undermined the Bonosol scheme, the nationalization along with the IDH 
provided the government windfall profits to fund Renta Dignidad. Passed in 2007 and 
implemented in 2008, Renta Dignidad expanded eligibility to Bolivians over the age of 
60; dropped a restriction on the elderly born before 1975; and increased the benefit by 25 
percent. Along with these benefits, Renta Dignidad also contributes $254 to funeral 
expenses for Renta Dignidad beneficiaries. There are currently 800,000 recipients of 
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Renta Dignidad and over $500 million has been paid since its inception (Gonzales, 2011). 
Like BJP, the armed forces play an important role in handing out the pension. Along with 
approved financial institutions, many military installations and mobile units distribute the 
pension, improving coverage especially in remote rural areas.  
Findings  
Findings on the Renta Dignidad pension come from government reports, along 
with a UN report on the program by Marcelo Gonzales (2011) and the other half of the 
Medinaceli and Mokrani (2010) report cited in the above section on BJP. Surveys of 
Renta Dignidad recipients in El Alto (Vaughan, 2010) provide information on the daily 
uses of the pension and a report from Carlos Jemio (2006) brings context from the 
Bonosol program.  
Studies based on data from the Bonosol program (Jemio, 2006; Medinaceli & 
Mokrani, 2010) and newer data (Gonzales, 2011) paint a developing picture of how 
Renta Dignidad reduces old-age poverty today. The study by Jemio reviews the impact 
Bonosol had on poverty alleviation from 2001 to 2004. Medinaceli and Mokrani’s report 
also uses data collected on Bonosol to estimate the impact Renta Dignidad would have at 
its increased rate. Together, these reports indicate that those receiving the pension fare 
slightly better than those that do not. Up to 2007, poverty alleviation credited to 
Bonosol/Renta Dignidad in these studies ranges from less than one percent to two 
percent, depending on geography. The cash transfer tended to benefit poor rural 
recipients most. Renta Diginidad recipients spend the majority of their transfer on basic 
needs, like food, health, and clothing (Jemio, 2006; Vaughan, 2010; Gonzales, 2011). 
Unlike BJP, the larger size of Renta Dignidad payments makes it possible to re-invest the 
transfers beyond immediate consumption. Some recipients have used the CCT as capital 
to start small businesses.17  
                                                
17 This is especially true if the individual does not need Renta Dignidad to make ends meet. 
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The Gonzales report, however, paints a different picture of Renta Dignidad’s 
impact on poverty reduction. Expanding the program window out to 2009, Gonzales uses 
reports from the Ministry of Economy and Finance to show that extreme poverty fell 
rapidly from 37.7 percent of the population in 2007 to 31.9 percent by 2009. Gonzales 
attributes this steep drop in extreme poverty to Renta Dignidad as well as BJP and Bono 
Juana Azurduy. While there is a correlation between a drop in extreme poverty and the 
start of these social transfers, it is unclear if the decrease can be attributed to these 
programs alone, especially considering Bolivia’s strong economic growth over the same 
window of time. Bolivia’s GDP grew at 4.8 percent in 2006 and continued to rise, 
reaching 6.1 percent in 2008. Even in 2009, Bolivia’s GDP rose 3.4 percent, one of the 
strongest grow rates in the region that year (ECLAC, 2011). Gonzales does not take this 
into consideration. 
Like BJP, there is some debate over how effective Renta Dignidad is at reaching 
those that need it most. All Bolivians have the right to the pension but the two-tiered 
payout18 prioritizes citizens without social security benefits. The question is whether or 
not the more vulnerable portions of the population are taking advantage of Renta 
Dignidad. Medinaceli and Mokrani’s (2010) study based on Bonosol data suggests Renta 
Dignidad is progressive in its redistribution, favoring those without a pension, but the 
effect is moderated with different eligible socio-economic groups benefiting fairly 
evenly. A more recent study from the UN Development Programme (Gonzales, 2011) 
suggests the pension is much more progressive than previously thought. The report notes 
that 83 percent of the pension’s recipients were not previously receiving a pension from 
the social security scheme, demonstrating that those most in need are receiving the lion’s 
share of the benefit. The UNDP study also reports that 97 percent of eligible beneficiaries 
already receive the pension.  
                                                
18 Bs 1,800 for those with a pension and Bs 2,400 for those without.  
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On a social level, the pension also has positive effects on the role recipients play 
in multi-generational households. Gonzales (2011) notes that Renta Dignidad recipients 
can use their pension to help contribute to family budgets, providing meaningful financial 
assistance to needy families. Abuse does happen, however. Interviews conducted in El 
Alto of Renta Dignidad and BJP recipients named alcohol as the most common form of 
misspending the transfer and also noted that family members sometimes take the transfer 
from elderly recipients without permission to pay debts (Vaughan, 2010).  
Analysis  
While the UNDP report paints a positive picture of Renta Dignidad’s coverage, 
access to the payment is still a challenge for many beneficiaries. Administrative and 
geographic hurdles impede beneficiaries’ ability to claim their pension. Possession of 
state-issued identification is a common administrative challenge, as many would-be 
recipients, especially in rural areas, do not have the required documentation to claim their 
pension. The government is currently in the process of implementing a biometric 
registration of eligible beneficiaries to eliminate the need for personal identification 
documents to claim the pension (El Diario, 2011). While the process sidesteps a need for 
official identification it still requires people to register, which leads to the geographic 
challenges beneficiaries face. The Bonosol struggled to offer an adequate number of 
locations for beneficiaries to claim their benefit. While workers in the formal sector could 
have their payments posted on their paychecks, informal and rural workers had to use 
approved public locations. The Morales government has improved on this by 
incorporating the armed forces into the program. Today, mobile pay units operated by the 
military use satellite technology to greatly improve the reach of the program (Gonzales, 
2011).  
Beyond administrative and geographic concerns, the greatest threat to Renta 
Dignidad’s long-term success is its vulnerability to price shocks in Bolivia’s main export, 
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natural gas. Unlike the BJP, which draws funding from YPFB and COMIBOL, Renta 
Dignidad’s funding is completely dependent on the IDH and, by extension, the price of 
natural gas.19 Thousands of Bolivians could be without their pension if the gas price 
drops or if Bolivia is unable to successfully renegotiate its contracts with Brazil or 
Argentina, who currently purchase all of Bolivia’s gas exports. Renta Dignidad consumes 
approximately 30 percent of the IDH, reaching $237 million in 2009 (Gonzales, 2011). 
Additional growth in the program’s rolls will have to be proportionate to growth in the 
natural gas sector to maintain a balanced and sustainable redistribution of gas revenues. 
With 7.5 percent of the Bolivian population depending on Renta Dignidad, the Bolivian 
government should also invest in a stabilization fund to help offset future volatility in the 
price of natural gas. 
Like BJP, the lack of official poverty data complicates assessments of Renta 
Dignidad (Salazar de la Torre, Dolores Castro Mantilla, & Medinaceli, 2011) (Salazar de 
la Torre, Dolores Castro Mantilla, & Medinaceli, 2011) (Salazar de la Torre, Dolores 
Castro Mantilla, & Medinaceli, 2011). Data that are available do not present a detailed 
picture of elderly Bolivians receiving the pension. Some argue that more specific 
information about beneficiaries could help target problem groups in the system and 
improve efficiency. Politically, the Morales government might be slow to react to this 
point since it could be portrayed as compromising the pension’s universality. Without 
updated poverty statistics it is difficult to assess how Morales’ changes to the program 
have influenced results. When updated poverty and demographic data are available, it 
will be difficult to gauge the impacts of Renta Dignidad versus the positive 
macroeconomic effects of the economy.  
                                                
19 Arguably, the IDH and YPFB are not all that different, considering both rely on the price of natural gas 
for their contributions to social policy. COMIBOL, however dependent on mineral commodities, at least 
provides some insulation for BJP from natural gas price shocks. 
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Finally, Renta Dignidad needs support from additional social programs and labor 
policy to address the large number of older Bolivians working in the informal economy 
(Salazar de la Torre, Dolores Castro Mantilla, & Medinaceli, 2011). While Renta 
Dignidad presents an important step toward alleviating old-age poverty, it alone does 
little to restructure the wider economy that pushes individuals into the informal sector or 
low-paying jobs. Similar to how BJP would benefit from more supply-side support, 
Renta Dignidad would be more effective through a holistic approach.    
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF NON-TARGETED CASH TRANSFERS  
BJP and Renta Dignidad have generally met their goals but both programs face 
challenges going forward. BJP has helped maintain enrollment levels in primary school 
but has had little proven effect increasing student retention in schools. There is also 
debate as to whether or not a non-targeted approach—or cash transfers in general—
allocates revenues from the country’s natural resources in the most productive way 
(Humberto Lopez & Perry, 2008). Without complementary investments in supply-side 
issues like school infrastructure and teachers, a long-term vision and commitment from 
the central government to ensure the program’s longevity, direct cash transfers alone will 
likely have limited results addressing school desertion. Renta Dignidad appears to have 
positive results, especially in diminishing extreme poverty. Data supporting this finding, 
however, is based on estimates, not actual household surveys. Bolivia has not seen as 
dramatic results from its cash transfers as those in neighboring Brazil, but these social 
programs are generally considered successful (Gonzales, 2011). In a country where 
education levels continue to hover among the lowest in Latin America, and poverty 
remains at over 50 percent20—higher still for the elderly—any progress is hard to 
dismiss.    
 
                                                
20 Assuming estimates from INE prove true.  
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While the effectiveness of universal cash transfers is debatable and additional data 
is needed to verify their success rate meeting program goals, officials and academics 
interviewed shared concern over the politicization of these popular programs. Despite the 
benefits cash transfers have for poverty alleviation and human capital development, the 
act of handing out money to poor citizens has been criticized as thinly veiled vote buying 
(Sewall, 2008; Layton & Smith, 2011). When approached about this perceived 
clientelism, a government official responded that the resource-funded transfers are an 
“obligation, the money belongs to the Bolivian people,” (Tapia Huanaco, Murillo 
Zambrana, & Flores Sotomayor, 2011, p. 108), reflecting a rights-based approach to 
universal redistribution.   
Interviews with key informants in La Paz did not present a unified vision of how 
the programs’ universality was perceived politically. Some argued that the lack of 
targeting de-politicized the transfers by their distribution to all Bolivians, regardless of 
economic, social, or political status (J. Pérez & R. Martínez, personal communication, 
July 6, 2012) while another cited universal eligibility as a way to protect against 
discriminatory spending that would unfairly benefit some groups over others (F. 
Fernández, July 11, 2012). Whatever the case, the decision to pursue universalist social 
policy breaks with the dominant norms of targeting and means tests in Latin America. 
While the government has issue-driven goals behind Renta Dignidad and BJP, their 
universalism speaks to the government’s wider political project (perhaps at the cost of 
their efficacy addressing social concerns). The following chapter will examine the 
political dimensions of these transfers, exploring how their universalism helps create 
political coalitions, improve national solidarity, secure the support of the armed forces, 




Chapter 4. Political Impact of Universal Social Policy  
A survey from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) (Morales, 
Eguívar, Blum, Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010) noted that Morales was the first 
Bolivian president since 1997 to finish a full five-year term in office. Starting with 
Banzer’s resignation in 2001 for health reasons, every following president has been 
forced from office (Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa) or did not win a full term in office 
(Rodríguez). Key informant interviews (F. Wanderley, personal communication, July 4, 
2011; J. C. Guzmán, personal communication, June 29, 2011; F. Gatta, personal 
communitcaion, July 13, 2011) suggested that the political benefits of universal social 
policy contributed to Morales’ improved governability during his time in office. After 
reviewing the policy impacts of Bolivia’s cash transfer programs in the previous chapter, 
it becomes clear that there were additional, political considerations that influenced the 
government’s decision to make them universal.  
As the fourth president of Bolivia in as many years, Evo Morales was under 
pressure to deliver quickly on his campaign promises. Jaime Solares, Morales’ fellow 
leftist and leader of the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, said, “It is obvious that if Evo 
doesn’t nationalize the gas and the hydrocarbons, he will fall like Gonzalo Sanchez [sic] 
de Lozada,” (do Alto, 2005, para. 10). Morales did make good on his promise to increase 
state control of the industry but had to follow through with programs to redistribute 
natural gas wealth. Pushing forward his redistributive policies, Morales launched BJP in 
November 2006. This quick succession of events was designed, in part, to quell the 
public’s demands for nationalization and redistribution. A CCT was an ideal solution 
because of its quick implementation and large pool of potential recipients. Renta 
Dignidad soon followed in 2007. Administratively, universal programs have the simplest 
structure and lowest transaction costs for the government (Müller, 2009).  
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The central government used cash transfers for three main political objectives: 
expanding the MAS’ political base, nation building, and securing the support of the 
armed forces. The cash transfers rewarded low-income groups, mostly likely MAS 
supporters (Seligson, Cordova, Donoso, Morales, Orcés, & Blum, 2006), with quick 
material benefits while larger sums via Renta Dignidad attracted middle-class supporters. 
Meanwhile, the transfers’ universalism contributed to the MAS’ nation-building project. 
The program’s universalism allowed it to reach across class and territorial lines, 
connecting Bolivians in a shared political community defined by mutual benefit derived 
from resource wealth. Furthermore, the central government headed off attempts by the 
Media Luna to create rival social policy by forcing them to pay for Renta Dignidad out of 
their IDH allocation. By involving the Bolivian military early in the implementation of 
the cash transfers as an extension of their role as defenders of the nation’s resource 
wealth, Morales was able to secure the support of the armed forces and defend against the 
threat of a coup d’état.  
Reaping political benefits from these cash transfers does not diminish the 
government’s concern for social justice and responsive relationship to the public. Rather, 
it is important to recognize the wider environment in which these transfers operated and 
the role they played in solidifying critical political support for Morales and the MAS in 
the early years of his presidency.    
UNIVERSAL SOCIAL POLICY AS ECONOMIC POPULISM 
Considering the MAS’ political base, universalism promised to be an effective 
tool to reward supporters while countering accusations of clientelism. Madrid’s (2008) 
analysis of the 2005 election showed that groups who supported Morales likely had 
indigenous backgrounds, leftist or nationalist views, and were disenchanted with the 
political system. In addition, LAPOP’s report on the 2005 elections highlights that poorer 
voters were statistically more likely to vote for Morales (Seligson, Cordova, Donoso, 
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Morales, Orcés, & Blum, 2006). Esping-Andersen’s (1990) survey of social policy notes 
that programs like BJP and Renta Dignidad that distribute one flat-rate to its recipients 
reach all levels of the public but have greater financial impact for lower-income groups. 
Data from Medinaceli and Mokrani (2010) and Gonzales (2011) in the previous chapter 
demonstrate that low-income groups benefit the most from BJP and Renta Dignidad 
either because of upper-income groups selecting themselves out of the program or the 
greater contribution to household income the transfers make. Considering the MAS’ 
mostly lower and middle class supporters in 2005, it is not surprising that the 
government’s resulting social policy would aim, albeit indirectly, at these groups. The 
quick rollout, low cost, and high political benefits of these cash transfers helped the 
Morales administration secure widespread support.  
Nationalization was already a popular political objective for indigenous and leftist 
social movements in Bolivia but centrist and right-wing voters were almost equally likely 
to support the return of the hydrocarbon industry to the state (Madrid, 2008, p. 495). 
Broad support for nationalizing the hydrocarbon sector illustrates the unique moment in 
Bolivia where diverse social and economic groups coalesced around a key political issue. 
The central government sought to cement this solidarity through social policy. Morales’ 
approval rating jumped 13 points to 81 percent after the state takeover of the hydrocarbon 
industry in May 2006 (Madrid, 2008). That November, a survey by Equipo Mori (2007) 
in El Alto, La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and Tarija showed that 53 percent—up 27 
percent from October—of Bolivians thought the country was headed in the right direction 
after the government launched BJP and gas contracts were signed, finalizing the terms of 
the nationalization.   
Since BJP began, the Morales administration has been using universal social 
policy to strengthen the MAS’ political base. Specifically, administration speeches from 
Morales and Vice President García Linera show that the administration wove the wider 
MAS political project, nationalization, and cash transfers together in the same cloth. 
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Speaking to supporters the same month that BJP went into effect, Morales warned that 
the opposition did not want that “the nationalization take hold, they […] want to sign 
contracts without any benefit for Bolivia and the Bono ‘Juancito Pinto’ is also at risk,” 
(Translation mine, Agence France Presse - Spanish, 2006). The years have not 
diminished the government’s themes of resource nationalism and universal social policy. 
In 2009, looking to secure a two-thirds majority for the MAS in the Senate, Morales 
implored, “If you vote for the opposition candidates they’re going to end the Bono 
Juancito Pinto that benefits young children; they’ll end the Renta Dignidad that your 
fathers, grandfathers, and brothers collect,” (Translation mine, La Razón, 2009). At a 
ceremony for the BJP, García Linera told a crowd of school children and parents, “The 
president nationalized the gas and it is the obligation of boys and girls, of their parents to 
make sure they never take the Bolivians’ gas and oil, today you all need to defend the 
State, the gas and oil of the Bolivian people,” (Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia, 2011). The vice president not only addresses the children, but their parents, 
the voters. Morales and García Linera clearly utilize resource-funded social policy to 
mobilize political support by presenting it as a social right constantly under threat from 
the opposition. Only by continuing to support the MAS, the argument goes, will the 
distribution of cash transfers be guaranteed. 
Appealing to voters’ concerns over continued receipt of universal social policy is 
effective because sectors across the country have a strong preference for it. A 2012 report 
(Asociación Boliviana de Ciencia Política, 2012) on the quality of democracy in Bolivia 
further reinforced the political importance of universal social policy. Conducted in 2011, 
the survey asked what had been the Morales government’s most important contribution to 
date. Cash transfer social policy came in second (13 percent) to “social, political, 
intercultural inclusion” (31.3 percent). Interestingly, cash transfers were listed as more 
important than nationalization (5 percent) and the new Constitution (7 percent). This 
shows that the direct redistributive aspect of nationalization (resource-funded social 
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policy) resonates more with the Bolivian public than the abstract notion of state control 
over strategic sectors of the economy.21  
Regional data on these programs further illustrates their ability to build political 
support for the central government. In May 2009, Ipsos Apoyo (2009) surveyed Bolivians 
in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz if they approved of Morales’ presidency 
and why. His perceived concern and actions to help the poor was the number one reason, 
with Santa Cruz, the epicenter of autonomy tensions, reporting the highest level of 
approval at 48 percent and El Alto the lowest at 19 percent. BJP was the second reason 
given with El Alto22 reporting the highest level of support at 25 percent and Santa Cruz 
the lowest at 1 percent. Renta Dignidad came in slightly lower than BJP, with 13 and 17 
percent in La Paz and El Alto. Santa Cruz again reported the lowest approval at 1 percent.  
The February 2011 opinion survey from Ipsos Apoyo (2011) of the same cities, in 
fact, found that BJP and Renta Dignidad rose to the top reasons why Bolivians supported 
Evo Morales. Fifty percent overall of those surveyed listed BJP as the reason they 
approve of the president and 47 percent named Renta Dignidad. Approval for these social 
programs did not necessarily fall along territorial lines as might be expected. BJP, for 
example, was more popular in the city of Santa Cruz (39 percent) than in La Paz (37 
percent). Heavily indigenous El Alto approved of BJP and Renta Dignidad by 67 percent 
and 59 percent, relatively. Cochabamba, the MAS’ hometown, also showed strong 
support for these programs. All four of the major cities surveyed showed increased 
support for the president’s social programs between 2009 and 2011.  
The comparison of 2009 and 2011 survey data shows that the Morales 
administration’s universal social policy has become more popular in Bolivia over time, 
most notably in opposition-controlled Santa Cruz. The case of improved support in Santa 
                                                
21 Despite the fact that these programs, in their current form, would not be possible without nationalization 
(especially BJP).  
22 It is worth remembering that BJP was based on a similar, smaller program that started in El Alto named 
Bono Esperanza. This may contribute to the level of support Morales garners from BJP in this city. 
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Cruz for these programs is, in part,23 thanks to the programs’ universality. Since all 
school children and Bolivians over 60 are eligible for these programs, the level of 
coverage is essentially a question of population density. As one of the most populous 
departments in the country, Santa Cruz benefits more from these transfers than less 
populated departments like Beni or Pando. Santa Cruz has the highest BJP participation 
rate in the country at 25.5 percent with La Paz coming in second at 25.2 percent (Cambio, 
2011). Santa Cruz also receives the second largest proportion of Renta Dignidad at 17.1 
percent (Viceministerio de Pensiones y Servicios Financieros, 2012). Interestingly, the 
programs’ ability to garner support in the opposition-controlled Santa Cruz illustrates the 
ability of universal social policy to cross territorial lines to connect diverse sectors of the 
country.  
Support for the MAS continues to gain ground in the Media Luna region. While 
the Ipsos surveys do not present data on Beni and Tarija, LAPOP (Morales, Eguívar, 
Blum, Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010, p. 173) survey data from 2005 and 2009 
showed that approval for the MAS rose in each state over that period of time. Approval in 
Tarija rose from 31.6 percent to 51.1 percent; approval in Beni rose from 16.5 percent to 
37.7 percent. In 2010, the MAS won six of the country’s nine prefectures, leaving only 
Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija in opposition control (Centellas, 2010).   
Similar to the experience of Quebecois being brought into the fold of Canadian 
nationalism through national healthcare (Banting, 2005; Boychuk, 2008), BJP and Renta 
Dignidad made headway connecting regional groups to the central government and the 
Bolivian imagined community through the mutual benefit of resource-funded social 
policy. At the time of the 2011 survey, however, Morales’ approval rating had fallen to 
32 percent from its apex at 70 percent in January 2010. Despite Morales’ drop in the 
polls, his cash transfers continue to buttress his political authority. This demonstrates the 
                                                
23 Other factors beyond population alone could affect this number.  
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critical role social policy plays in building political support for the MAS even when the 
president is not popular. The Morales administration used universal social policy to 
reward poor voters and appease social movements, secure support for the MAS agenda, 
and expand its political base across territorial lines.     
UNIVERSAL SOCIAL POLICY AS NATION BUILDING  
BJP and Renta Dignidad have been effective political tools for addressing the 
MAS administration’s immediate concerns upon entering office but they also played a 
critical role in the new government’s attempts at nation building. Since Morales took 
office in 2006 and the start of universal social policy, LAPOP (Morales, Eguívar, Blum, 
Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010) reports there has been a significant increase in the 
number of Bolivians who say they are proud to live under the current system. Since its 
10-year low of 44 percent in 2000, 56 percent of Bolivians surveyed in 2010 said they 
were proud of the Bolivian political system. Receiving cash transfers from the 
government was listed as one of the factors that positively influenced peoples’ perception 
of the Bolivian government. The largest single indicator of national pride was the 
administration’s perceived dedication to fighting poverty.  
The Morales administration used universal social policy to create a shared 
political community through the mutual benefit of nationalized resources and weaken 
regional autonomous movements. Understanding the MAS’ conception of universal 
social policy as nation building starts with an examination of the NDP and how it frames 
resource redistribution and national identity. The MAS’ unifying message of 
universalism also illustrates the central government’s conflict with the Media Luna’s 
calls for autonomy.  
The NDP is key to understanding the MAS’ view of redistribution through social 
policy as a tool for nation building. One of the first steps the NDP does is call for 
Bolivians to “[recognize] ourselves for who we are, diverse and many, and it is a long 
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process […] to arrive at a collective conscience of a new national identity” (Ministerio de 
Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006, p. 14). The plan is blunt with its assessment of the 
state of the population: “profound social inequality and inhuman exclusion […] oppresses 
the majority of the Bolivian people,” (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006, p. 
1). In light of the plight facing the majority of Bolivians, the role of the new development 
model is the generation, control, and distribution of the surplus produced by renewable 
and non-renewable natural resources to assist in national development. Arguing that the 
country’s “profound” inequality demands the “redistribution of the national wealth for 
the benefit of the social sectors traditionally excluded from the means of production and 
dignified work” (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006, p. 5), the NDP 
connects redistribution with social inclusion and development. In this way the MAS 
conceptualizes universal social policy as the vehicle for national wealth redistribution to 
expand social inclusion and address poverty in pursuit of a new Bolivian identity.    
In order to raise the welfare of the majority of Bolivians, the NDP anticipates cash 
transfers as the vehicle for this redistribution, stating that welfare will be necessary “in 
the first stage […] to grant food transfers and basic services to reach a minimum level of 
dignity in the communities that live in the worst conditions” (Ministerio de Planificación 
del Desarrollo, 2006, p. 33). Among the groups listed for such welfare assistance are 
young children (specifically in the context of school desertion), the elderly, and pregnant 
women. All three groups have cash transfers today. The connection between resources 
and social inclusion is spelled out explicitly in Supreme Decree 28899 which established 
BJP. The decree reads, “Considering that […] the nationalization of hydrocarbons 
generates large income for the State, [these rents] should be used to improve the lives of 
the Bolivian people and especially the youth,” (Translation mine). Again, the benefits of 
natural resources are framed universally, reserved to improve the lives of all Bolivians. 
The language of the NDP and Supreme Decree 28899 demonstrate the connection the 
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MAS administration draws between redistribution and the formation of a new Bolivian 
identity. 
Autonomy and Social Policy  
Universal social policy has been shown to be an effective tool for building 
political support across territorial lines and even improving national pride but its 
financing structure also has the potential to fight elite-organized autonomy movements in 
the Media Luna. Autonomy itself is not anathema to the MAS political project. The 
MAS’ plurinational project envisions several layers of community-focused autonomy in 
Bolivia. The 2009 Constitution lays out four levels of autonomy in Bolivia: departmental, 
regional, municipal, and indigenous. The MAS, as described by García Linera, sees the 
central government as the core of these nesting autonomies, holding them all together. By 
financing Renta Dignidad out of prefecture budgets, the Morales administration kept the 
departments dependent on transfers from the central government while weakening their 
ability to fund rival social policy.     
It is not surprising that the gas-rich states strive for greater control over the 
resources produced in their own region. Departments and municipalities are both heavily 
dependent on the IDH for their budgets. The IDH allocates a disproportionately high 
percentage of natural gas royalties back to gas-producing departments and the sparsely 
populated departments of Beni and Pando. Under the IDH the Media Luna receives 30 
percent of hydrocarbon revenues compared to 19.7 percent for the remaining five 
departments, despite the fact that the remaining departments have a population 79 percent 
greater than that of the Media Luna(Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008). The tax’s preference 
for gas-producing departments led to the expectation of greater fiscal decentralization in 
the extractive sector, as seen in the calls for autonomy following Morales’ election 
(Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010).  
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The conservative Media Luna region’s definition of regional autonomy was a 
radical shift from Bolivia’s unitary model. The Media Luna, and the department of Santa 
Cruz, in particular, demanded regional control over natural resources, the right to retain 
two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the department, and the authority to set all 
policies other than defense, currency, tariffs, and foreign relations (Eaton, 2007). Elites in 
these gas-producing states wanted to deal directly with multi-national corporations, 
issuing their own concessions and capturing the majority of the rents (von der Heydt-
Coca, 2009). The autonomy movement threatened to erode Bolivian nationalism through 
radical decentralization while cutting off the central government’s most important 
revenue stream.  
Prefectures dispensed their IDH allocations with largesse. The department of 
Tarija, for example, spent its IDH funds to provide free health insurance, small farm 
development, and highway projects (Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). This kind of 
social policy competes with the central government’s role as the sole guarantor of 
resource-funded social programs and attracts loyalty to department governments. In 
response to the autonomy movement’s threat to national integrity and accompanying 
social policy the MAS proposed funding the re-branded Bonosol, Renta Dignidad, with 
the IDH funds (Müller, 2009). When the plan was originally announced in 2007, protests 
spread across the country as departmental and municipal supporters, and university 
students challenged any reduction in their IDH funds (El Deber, 2007).  
In the end, municipal governments and universities did not suffer any reduction in 
their IDH transfer. Renta Dignidad was paid out exclusively from prefecture budgets 
(Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010; Müller, 2009). Prefectures contested the payment plan, 
arguing that it amounted to a 38 percent reduction in their IDH transfers or eight percent 
of their total funds (Gray Molina & Yañez, 2010; Gray Molina, 2010). Morales retorted 
that the money from the IDH was not for “one or two, but all Bolivians,” and framed the 
decision to pay for Renta Dignidad with prefecture funds in order to “improve the 
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redistribution” of the tax revenues, referring to the Media Luna’s disproportionate benefit 
from the tax (El Deber, 2007). The Media Luna proposed its own scheme for funding 
Renta Dignidad without touching the IDH. When the central government came back with 
its own compromise to compensate prefectures with a $117 million fund and later to 
return part of the money raised from the IDH, the opposition baulked, refusing to agree to 
any reductions (International Crisis Group, 2008). Unable to reach a compromise, the 
central government pushed through its own plan, funding the pension completely from 
prefectures’ share of the IDH. The result punished what the government perceived to be 
overly aggressive demands for autonomy without harming municipal governments 
(which tend to be more supportive of the MAS (Eaton, 2007)) and university budgets.  
Despite complaints about the financing of the pension, the decision to fund Renta 
Dignidad with prefecture budgets paid off well for Morales. Müller (2009) notes that 
Renta Dignidad is more popular than its predecessor, the Bonosol. Even critics of the 
program focus their challenge on its financing scheme, not the pension itself. With the 
program’s broad acceptance and popularity, the quibbling over the financing mechanisms 
was lost on the average voter to Morales’ benefit. Opposition leaders in the eastern 
lowlands, like Carlos Mesa (2010), continue to bemoan the central government’s control 
over natural resource rents, saying, “the mechanism for distribution has frozen up with 
the government ceding nothing. Neither have they conceptually established autonomous 
mechanisms for the reassigning of resources.” Mesa’s statement reinforces the continued 
importance of controlling access to natural resource revenues as a means to build political 
support. Reducing the prefectures’ ability to fund ambitious social policy while 
expanding the central government’s own programs, the Morales administration 
strengthened the impact of universal social policy in the Media Luna.   
Despite the victory against opposition prefectures, the expansion of universal 
social policy’s popularity across the country does not coincide with reduced desire for 
autonomy. The 2010 LAPOP survey on democracy in Bolivia (Morales, Eguívar, Blum, 
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Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010) reported that support for departmental and 
indigenous autonomy in Bolivia increased between 2008 and 2010. LAPOP reports that 
57.6 percent of those surveyed thought departmental autonomy would be positive for the 
country and 50.3 approved of indigenous autonomy (p. 177). Support for autonomy does 
not necessarily mean individuals do not have a strong national identity. Data from Gallup 
(Crabtree & Ríos, 2008) collected in 2007, soon after the national referendum on 
departmental autonomy, showed that upper- and middle-class (57 percent), and lower- or 
working-class Bolivians (53 percent) identified most with the nation over their region. It 
is also notable that while support for autonomy has increased, support for government 
intervention in the economy and especially the hydrocarbon sector remains high.  
LAPOP created a statism index to measure groups’ approval of the State taking an 
active role in solving the country’s social and economic problems.24 The report (Morales, 
Eguívar, Blum, Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010) noted that there was a slight 
decrease in approval for state interference in the economy but the approval rating overall 
remained very high in 2010. The index reached as high as 74.4 percent approval in 
Cochabamba and even Chuquisaca, registering the lowest approval rating for active state 
involvement, came in at 63.9 percent. LAPOP points out that favoring central 
government involvement in strategic sectors of the economy tended to fall along an east-
west divide, with Media Luna departments favoring less central government involvement. 
Regardless, the approval rating remains high across the board, despite lower levels of 
support in the lowlands. The results show that preference for autonomy and support for a 
strong central government role in economic and social affairs are not mutually exclusive.   
Considering the increased level of national pride since Morales took office, the 
important role that social policy plays in people’s perception of the administration, and 
continually high approval of the state’s role in solving economic and social problems, it 
                                                
24 Includes a positive vision of the State’s potential as a protagonist in guaranteeing economic stability and 
growth and the provision of public services.  
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is likely that universal social policy has contributed to nation building efforts by the 
Morales administration. The NDP sought to create a new Bolivian identity by addressing 
chronic inequality through the universal redistribution of natural resource rents. Surveys 
reviewed here show that the government’s attempts at fighting poverty and its universal 
social policy are some of the greatest reasons for voter approval of the government. This 
demonstrates the government’s ability to successfully pursue its nationalist agenda.  
Finally, the high levels of support for government involvement in fighting poverty (as 
expressed in the statism index) and in strategic sectors of the economy (i.e., hydrocarbon) 
persist alongside rising approval for autonomy. This shows that a positive view of 
autonomy does not necessarily coincide with a negative view of the MAS nation-building 
project. 
It is not my intention to suggest that the receipt of universal social policy equates 
total acquiescence with the MAS political project. Bolivia remains a country with 
challenging political differences and active social movements that do not necessarily 
follow party lines.25 In the face of fractious identity politics, universal social policy 
offered the MAS an attractive means to unify a diverse population. The broad, loosely 
defined coalition born in the aftershocks of neoliberal reforms created a shared 
experience on which a national identity could be built. Universal social policy was 
designed to cement that bond. By extending the benefits from the widely supported 
nationalization, the Morales administration leveraged the powerful symbolism behind the 
natural gas sector and universal social policy to build a shared imagination of being 
Bolivian, portraying the MAS as the vehicle to a new plurinational nationhood (Harten, 
2011). At this level, universal social policy no longer simply complies with immediate 
political demands but plays a role in defining Bolivian citizenship.  
                                                
25 See (Moseley & Moreno, 2010) 
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The Bolivian central government’s behavior shows how social policy theory 
based in the West applies in a Latin American context. Facing regional opposition and 
autonomous movements, the central government utilized universal social policy to form 
bonds between citizens across class and territorial lines. Furthermore, the central 
government’s decision to fund Renta Dignidad out of prefecture budgets limited the 
Media Luna’s ability to fund rival social policy that would compete with the central 
government’s role as sole guarantor of resource wealth redistribution. Survey data on BJP 
and Renta Dignidad from 2009 and 2011 demonstrate how universal social policy 
continues to make inroads across territorial lines to the benefit of the MAS nation-
building project. 
SECURING THE ARMED FORCES  
The MAS needed broad political support to shore up their government but they 
also needed to secure the armed forces. So far the MAS has been able to secure the 
military through increased budgets and tapping into the armed forces’ inherent 
nationalism (Kohl, 2010; Rochlin, 2007). These factors certainly play important roles in 
winning over the military but focusing on these points alone overlooks the administrative 
involvement the military has in implementing universal social policy. The Morales 
administration incorporated the armed forces into its social policy by drawing parallels 
between the MAS nationalist project and the institution’s own history and resource 
nationalism and sovereignty.  
The connection between natural resources and sovereignty was a strong theme 
throughout 20th century Bolivia. The military socialist regime of General David Toro 
nationalized Standard Oil’s Bolivian concessions and property in 1937 and founded the 
Bolivian state oil company, YPFB (Maalderink, 2009). Along with the nationalization 
scheme, the military socialists foreshadowed the MAS’ emphasis on sovereignty as a 
political ideal. Following Bolivia’s defeat in the War of the Chaco, the military socialists 
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likened the territorial losses Bolivia suffered to a loss of economic sovereignty 
experienced through Bolivia’s dependent relationship on foreign countries. The MAS 
would use similar language in 2005, saying that Bolivia had to reassert its sovereignty in 
the face of decades of indebtedness to international financial institutions and 
subservience to the United States.  
García Linera (2010) writes that the Morales administration successfully 
integrated the armed forces into his government by addressing an “existential crisis” that 
the institution faced since the end of the military dictatorship in 1982. Neoliberal reforms 
had hollowed out the state and downplayed the role of sovereignty in a global market.   
The MAS NDP outlines the need to modernize the armed forces and involve them in 
national development. The NDP reproached the neoliberal government for not leveraging 
the military’s potential to “support public works and infrastructure […and the] extension 
of health and educational services, among others,” (Ministerio de Planificación del 
Desarrollo, 2006, p. 62).  
Along with the call to involve the military more in social development and 
assistance, the NDP assigned the military the role of protecting Bolivia’s strategic 
resources. Using the military to seize privatized natural gas fields was a symbolic gesture 
Bolivia made to the rest of the world but it also demonstrated to the armed forces that 
they too were part of the MAS’ transformative vision for a new Bolivia. Since then, 
Morales has continued to increase the armed forces’ role in the implementation of 
national development programs and social policy.  
When Evo Morales took office windfall income from the new tax structure 
governing natural gas exploitation allotted the government a staggering increase in 
revenues to fund anti-poverty programs but little in the way of infrastructure or 
bureaucracy to distribute the benefits. The government turned to the military—not the 
Ministry of Education—to distribute the funds for the BJP and Renta Diginidad 
programs. Considering the financial and administrative limitations of the central 
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government, the military was the practical choice for reaching schools and the aged in 
urban and far-flung parts of the country. The insistence on using the military to reach 
groups in all parts of the country also guarantees these social policies’ universalism, 
reinforcing the discourse that these benefits are for all Bolivians, regardless of their status 
or means to collect them. Within 10 months of Evo Morales taking office the military 
was handing out Bs 200 to BJP recipients.  
The military seems to have taken a shine to its new social development role. In 
2009, then-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Admiral José Luis Cabas said that 
all Bolivian children should feel that the State is a presence that protects and supports the 
development of all its citizens, noting that the armed forces participation in BJP reaffirms 
its duty to the Bolivian people and nation (Translation mine, ABI, 2009). Speaking to his 
support of the government’s social policies in 2012, former leader of the Bolivian Air 
Force, Gen. Tito Gandarillas said, “My two years at the helm of the Air Force allowed 
me to see the true dimension of the positive and promising process of change our beloved 
Bolivia is undergoing, in which the armed forces are deeply immersed,” (Translation 
mine, La Jornada, 2012). In fact, the armed forces’ connections to the current government 
have come under fire for being too cozy. In March 2012, representatives of the military 
were present at the MAS party congress in Cochabamba. Gandarillas said the military 
was present to show its support of the institution’s “completely distinct new role” in 
Bolivia’s process of change, supporting humanitarian, health, and educational tasks along 
with the distribution of social transfers (Los Tiempos, 2012). Critics alleged the 
military’s presence at a political event broke with all norms and perhaps even violated the 
Constitution.  
The MAS’ support of the military since the beginning of the Morales 
administration has helped ensure the institution’s loyalty. Along with expanding the 
armed forces budget, the government assigned them the new role of administering 
universal social policy. Framing BJP and Renta Dignidad as social rights derived from 
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nationalized sectors of the economy, the administration expanded the military’s role from 
defending natural resources to redistributing their wealth.  
LIMITS OF UNIVERSAL SOCIAL POLICY  
Considering the wider political context outside social policy alone, it becomes 
clear why the government decided to implement BJP and Renta Dignidad with universal 
eligibility. Morales and the MAS’ universal social policies rewarded political supporters 
with quick material benefits, designed funding mechanisms to undercut autonomy 
movements that would have compromised the government’s redistributive agenda, and 
re-defined the military’s relationship to the public. Beyond these political motivations, 
the administration sought to use universal social policy to forge a new national identity 
for Bolivia that united the fractious country through shared benefits from the nation’s 
resource wealth. Bolivia was primed to re-imagine itself as a nation after coming together 
around a shared sense of frustration with neoliberalism and its outcomes. Leveraging the 
symbolism of the natural gas sector, the Morales administration extended the benefits 
from nationalization widely through cash transfers to cement cross-class and territorial 
solidarity. Not only did cash transfers help shore up broad political support for the MAS 
but their universalism helped further the ideological goal of laying the foundation for a 
new shared national identity.  
Morales’ use of cash transfers to build broader political coalitions and neutralize 
potential threats to the MAS government largely represents the successful consolidation 
of power achieved during his first term as president. His efforts established a wide base 
of support to draft a new constitution in 2006 and its eventual approval by referendum in 
2009; he overcame a tumultuous (and violent) autonomy movement in the eastern 
lowlands and a 2008 recall referendum; and, ultimately, Morales was reelected in 2009 
under the new constitution with an absolute majority of 64.2 percent, surpassing his 
historic 2005 victory where he won 53.7 percent of the vote (Morales, Eguívar, Blum, 
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Villazón, Nikitenko, & Seligson, 2010). Morales and the MAS’ universal social policies 
and resource nationalism played instrumental roles in securing these victories.  
But the honeymoon may be over. Morales’ approval rating was at 70 percent in 
January 2009 but had fallen by half to 35 percent by December 2011; approval slumped 
even further to 32 percent by February 2012 (Miranda, 2011). As the MAS has moved 
into political dominance in Bolivia, the question has become whether or not Morales has 
enough political capital to continue pushing his political agenda. The December 2010 
gasolinazo, an ill-timed repeal of state gasoline and diesel subsidies, erupted into a 
“flashback to the neoliberal days” (F. Wanderley, personal communication, July 4, 2011) 
with mass mobilizations across the country, including Morales’ political base. Within a 
week of the announcement, the government responded to public pressure and reversed its 
decision. Graffiti still litters La Paz calling Morales a “traitor.”  
In 2011, Morales faced the most dramatic conflict yet with his political base. The 
Indigenous Territory and Isiboro Sécure National Park (TIPNIS) in the eastern lowlands 
of Bolivia is home to the Chuman, Yurucare and Moxos indigenous communities. The 
park faces encroachment from ranchers, illegal loggers, landless Aymara and Quechua 
migrants from the highlands looking to plant coca, and possible natural gas development. 
A highway project funded by Brazil aims to improve its access to the Pacific through 
Bolivia and on to Peru and Chile. Most of the highway’s Bolivian portion is already 
complete but a key section of the road was planned to pass through TIPNIS.  
On August 15, 2011, indigenous groups and their supporters decried the project as 
a violation of their right to prior consent under the 2009 Constitution and announced a 
march on La Paz in protest. As nearly 1,000 marchers reached the town of Yucumo, riot 
police attacked the protestors in a scene of violence that would have seemed 
unimaginable in 2006, when Evo Morales assumed the presidency. The Yucumo attack’s 
political fallout led to the resignations of three cabinet members and a public apology 
from Morales (Read, 2011; Shahriari, 2011). When the march reached Plaza Murillo, the 
 
 61 
seat of Bolivian government in La Paz, the government again bowed to popular pressure 
and canceled the highway project in October 2011 (El País, 2011).  
Both the gasolinazo and TIPINIS conflicts illustrate that the MAS, despite its 
ascension to power, is still influenced by and beholden to grassroots social movements. 
The “flashback to neoliberal times” during the gasolinazo demonstrated that Morales did 
not have enough political capital from these social programs and other political assets to 
push through the unpopular reform. The TIPNIS controversy demonstrates the limits of 
universal social policy’s ability to bridge a fractious society and the increasingly 
complicated relationship the MAS has with its constituents. In order to maintain the 
government’s redistributive agenda, Morales’ administration has found itself defending 
large extractive projects to local communities. The unifying benefits of universal social 
policy break down as some groups disproportionally experience the negative externalities 
born from these industrial development projects as local groups prioritize their own 
agenda over the national one favoring extraction. The result leads to either a demand for 
greater control over the revenues, as in the Media Luna, or a refusal to comply with 
projects through free and informed and prior consent (FIPC) objections, as in the TIPNIS 
case. The next section aims to further develop this conflict between the need to fund 
universal social policy through extractive industries and the extractive model’s potential 






Chapter 5. Universal Social Policy in a Rentier State 
Since nationalizing the country’s hydrocarbons, Morales has directed gas royalties 
from wells in the eastern Media Luna region to fund national social programs for 
education, maternal health, and non-contributory pension schemes. One of the primary 
goals of Morales’ universal social policy was to cement a shared national identity. The 
result has tied industrial gas development to social development in Bolivia, pitting local 
and national interests against one another as one group demands the royalties from 
natural gas development and another demands the end of natural gas development as an 
infringement on their way of life. These conflicts demonstrate that while governability 
has improved since neoliberal administrations, universal social policy and resource 
nationalism are not panaceas for a persistently divided Bolivia. Social policy funded by 
natural resources aimed to create greater national solidarity in Bolivia but its structure 
exacerbates conflicts over resource development and the distribution of rents, ultimately 
threatening the early gains of universal social policy by re-enforcing regional identities.  
Bolivia’s experience with resource windfalls contrasts with the typical behavior of 
rentier states (Weyland, 2009). Most examples of the rentier state, one that derives the 
majority of its revenue from rents from natural resources, focus on the abundance of 
natural resource revenues as a cushion for elites to avoid political risks by keeping taxes 
low and buying off the opposition. Weyland (2009) notes that in Bolivia’s case this 
sudden influx of natural gas profits prompted the Morales government to take dramatic 
risks with its boom rents by boldly increasing social spending. Adjusting for inflation, 
social spending as a percentage of GDP rose 6.3 percent between 2005 and 2008 
(Weisbrot, Ray, & Johnston, 2009), the time period in which both BJP and Renta 
Dignidad were launched. These permanent commitments rest on fickle natural gas prices 
with little thought as to how the system would survive a downturn.  
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Asserting that Bolivia’s national resources should benefit the public served as a 
powerful tool to unify broad coalitions during Morales’ 2005 and 2009 elections. The 
implementation of this goal, however, could potentially splinter the nascent nationalism 
on which those victories depended. Bolivia’s shift toward a rentier economy provides the 
government the resources to implement popular cash transfers like BJP and Renta 
Diginidad, but leaves social development beholden to ever-expanding natural resource 
exploitation and volatile prices.  
This rentier approach poses several economic and political challenges for the 
long-term sustainability of these popular cash transfers and the MAS’ stated goals for the 
development of Bolivia. President Morales faces the difficult task of increasing natural 
gas production in the short term while exploring new fields and innovative ways to 
develop the broader economy if the dream of resource-led development is to come true. 
This chapter aims to explain why Bolivia’s economy is considered rentier and how this 
model manifests itself in the current Bolivian political context as progressive 
extractivism. Finally, the chapter explores several examples of how the extractivist model 
drives social conflicts, reinforcing ethnic and regional identities. 
RENTIER ECONOMY IN BOLIVIA  
Due to Bolivia’s windfall profits from natural gas exports and limited other 
economic options, demands for redistribution and other spending have pushed the 
country toward a rentier model. Considering the structural deficits in Bolivia’s economy, 
from a small manufacturing base to its land-locked geography, there is little doubt natural 
gas will continue to play an essential role in the Andean country’s economy (Wanderley, 
2008). A rentier model can have negative long-term outcomes (Karl, 1997), especially for 
a country that aims to move away from a dependence on raw material exports. Bolivia’s 
growing dependence on extractive industries and the lack of a diversified economy 
illustrate the economic concerns threatening the stability of Morales’ cash transfers. 
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Sachs and Warner’s (2001) “curse of natural resources” theory plots the tendency 
of resource-rich countries to suffer from weak domestic economies. Sachs and Warner’s 
assessment does not address the lasting impacts of a colonial past—for which Bolivia is 
the example par excellence—but it does serve as a cautionary tale for the impacts that 
sudden resource booms can have on a country. Laserna (2011; 2010), a vocal critic of 
Morales, claims the curse is taking shape in Bolivia through the current government’s 
rentier26 approach. Laserna (2011, p. 38) describes the “rentier trap” as, “the convergence 
of three factors: rent concentration, weak institutions, and social inequality.”  
Bolivia’s geographic concentration of wealth and social inequality have been 
discussed earlier, but the country finds itself at a distinct disadvantage regarding its 
institutions. Weak institutions are one of the themes running through many of the 
countries suffering from the resource curse (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). YPFB, 
the state oil company, lost much of its institutional knowledge and technical expertise 
under Sánchez de Lozada’s neoliberal reforms (Kohl, 2006). Many previous employees 
of YPFB who were fired have now been hired as consultants for foreign companies to do 
the same job they did for the state-owned company (M. Medinaceli, June 28, 2011; F. 
Wanderley, July 4, 2011). YPFB and the Ministry of Hydrocarbons have struggled with 
high turnover rates. In the first four years of Morales’ administration there were six 
different presidents of YPFB, many named thanks to political connections rather than 
expertise with the natural gas sector (Kaup, 2010).  
Riding high natural gas prices, Bolivia earned the acclaim of the International 
Monetary Fund for prudent savings during the boom times and applying counter-cyclical 
financial policies directed at re-investing in the public sector and social protection, 
including cash transfers (Schultz, 2010). The opportune timing of the nationalization also 
allowed Bolivia to pay down its national debt, running surpluses between 2006 and 2009 
                                                
26 See also Weyland (2009), Gray Molina,(2010 
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(Weisbrot, Ray, & Johnston, 2009). While Bolivia’s economic growth is encouraging, its 
current rentier economy is top heavy, balanced on the success of extractive industries.  
Political instability has proven a greater deterrent to investment than 
nationalization or higher taxes. Despite the concerns of international financial 
institutions, Morales’ nationalization has not harmed foreign direct investment in the 
country. FDI tanked in the tumultuous early 2000s, falling as low as -4.6 percent of GDP 
in 2005. Since then, the MAS’ improved governability has made the country more stable 
and facilitated some investment, climbing back up to between 2 and 3 percent between 
2006 and 2008 (Weisbrot, Ray, & Johnston, 2009). The majority of FDI, however, 
remains concentrated in the natural resource sector, nearly doubling from $370 million in 
2007 to $734 million in 2008, 62 percent of total foreign investment (Calderón, 
Mortimore, Razo, & Tavares, 2008). Since Morales took office, the World Bank (2012) 
reports, FDI has steadily increased, reaching nearly $622 million in 2010. Investment 
numbers have not been that high since 2002, before the Gas War. Bolstered by high 
international demand for natural resources, Bolivia’s GDP has also steadily grown at an 
average rate of 4.5 percent from 2004 to 2010 (ECLAC, 2011), buoying the country 
through the global recession. Thanks to the IDH and nationalization, 24 percent of the 
government’s revenue came from hydrocarbons in 2008 as opposed to 5.6 percent in 
2005 (Weisbrot, Ray, & Johnston, 2009).  
Despite the improving economy, cracks are starting to show in the rentier model. 
The Morales administration’s management of the economy helped insulate it from the 
worst shocks of the global recession by minimizing Bolivia’s dependence on U.S. 
markets and by adopting a counter-cyclical fiscal policy (Weisbrot, Ray, & Johnston, 
2009), but the drop in hydrocarbon sales world-wide and the resulting reduction in the 
IDH had significant impacts on regional and municipal budgets in Bolivia. Bolivia’s 
universal social policy is dependent not only on a few booming commodities but also 
limited customers.  Currently, Bolivia’s gas exports are sold exclusively to Brazil and 
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Argentina. Bolivia got a taste of decreased demand for its gas in 2009, when Brazil 
reduced its demand (Oxford Analytica, 2009). In 2009, IDH distribution to 
municipalities, prefectures, universities, and other funds dropped 40.53 percent due to 
falling hydrocarbon prices, 17 percent lower than expected (Bolpress, 2009). 
Furthermore, the Economy and Finance Ministry reported that there would be a 35 
percent decrease in IDH transfers to prefectures in 2010 (La Prensa, 2009). As a result of 
their great dependence on natural gas revenues, prefecture and municipal governments 
had to reorganize their budgets, holding infrastructure projects and reducing departmental 
and municipal social services. Given the volatility of hydrocarbon prices, it is difficult for 
prefecture and municipal governments to effectively manage their budgets and what 
services can be offered when the IDH can shift so dramatically.  
Price shocks aside, even Bolivia’s gas reserves are in doubt. In 2005, Bolivia was 
thought to hold the second largest natural gas reserves in South America after Venezuela. 
An April 2011 audit from the firm Ryder-Scott, however, challenged this optimistic 
vision. The firm dropped its estimate of Bolivia’s proven reserves to 9.94 trillion cubic 
feet (TCF) from the original 12.1 TCF (Shahriari, 2011). The downgrade knocked 
Bolivia from the region’s second largest reserves to the sixth, less than its two biggest 
export markets, Brazil and Argentina (BP, 2011). YPFB leadership says that Bolivia’s 
current proven reserves would meet external and internal demand until the year 2026, 
when export contracts expire (La Prensa, 2011). 
Progressive Extractivism  
High taxes and strong demand for natural gas have granted Bolivia windfall 
profits but they also increase the state’s dependence on an extractive boom-bust model. 
The emergence of cash transfers in Bolivia over the last six years is one example of how 
Bolivia’s permanent spending obligations have increased under the Morales government. 
While there have been tangible benefits from this increased spending, the funding model 
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threatens the country’s ability to continue paying these transfers in the years to come.  
Currently, the government must encourage continued expansion of extractive industries 
to generate the revenues needed to meet these programs’ commitments.  
Bolivia’s current level of production owes its success to gas found a decade ago, 
when neoliberal reforms opened the country to a burst of foreign exploration (Vargas, 
2011; M. Medinaceli, personal communitcaion, June 28, 2012; G. Gray Molina, personal 
communication, July 11, 2011). Gas exploration, however, had been declining when the 
Morales government nationalized the industry, creating the challenge of not only finding 
new wells but also getting them online (Kaup, 2010). The government has been 
committing great financial resources to this end. In 2011, Bolivia re-invested over $1.8 
billion in the hydrocarbon and electricity industry (Vásquez, 2011). Bolivia has opened 
investment in exploratory wells and announced a joint venture with Venezuela’s state oil 
company, PDVSA, known as Petroandina (AP, 2011). The joint venture’s total 
investment surpasses $1 billion for extraction and exploratory activities (Calderón, 
Mortimore, Razo, & Tavares, 2008). The billion-dollar joint venture will look for natural 
gas in the Amazon region closer to the capital, La Paz, far away from the established gas 
fields in the eastern departments.   
The Petroandina joint venture illustrates well the premise of ever-expanding 
extraction to fund Bolivia’s budget. Noting that the country experiences an asymmetry 
between the gas-rich lowlands and the more populated, poorer altiplano departments, 
García Linera trumpeted exploration as a way to address this inequality (EFE, 2008). 
Instead of reforming the IDH, which disproportionately favors gas-producing 
departments over more populated ones, like La Paz (Weisbrot & Sandoval, The 
Distribution of Bolivia's Most Important Natural Resources and the Autonomy Conflicts, 
2008), the government aims to increase production in the west. The policy does little to 
address the issue of gas-producing departments benefitting disproportionately from gas 
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extraction and increases the environmental and social costs of such development over a 
greater area.  
Morales and the MAS’ legitimacy rests on their ability to continue harnessing 
these resources for the nation’s benefit. An extraction-based model provides the 
government windfall profits but it also makes the government increasingly dependent on 
a single commodity. Without a robust domestic market for its natural gas, Bolivia must 
continually attract foreign investment to have wealth to redistribute (Rochlin, 2007). The 
potential for large windfalls from additional gas operations isolates government 
investment in the hydrocarbon and electricity sectors. As investment in extractive 
industries continues to grow and further concentrates the economy it becomes more 
difficult to tackle the long-term project of a diversified economy and stronger tax base 
(Karl, 1997). Chasing windfall profits from hydrocarbons, the Morales administration 
runs the risk of falling victim to boom-bust cycles of resource extraction that have 
plagued Bolivia throughout its history. The current model harnesses the productive 
capacity of capitalism for social development but faces the system’s harmful externalities 
to the detriment of the MAS political base.  
SOCIAL CONFLICTS UNDER THE RENTIER MODEL   
Despite the MAS’ goal of using nationalized resource wealth to address social 
inequality and build solidarity, the rentier model of funding nation-building programs 
inside Bolivia has led to more conflicts over time, not fewer. Using data on social 
conflicts27 in Bolivia from 1970 to 2008 from the Observatorio de Conflictos de CERES, 
Roberto Laserna (2010) outlined the close correlation between social conflicts in Bolivia 
and increasing estimates of natural resource wealth. As gas fields began to develop and 
rents from natural gas grew, so did public demonstrations calling for greater 
redistribution. Social conflicts continued to grow despite the Morales administration’s 
                                                
27 Laserna notes that 89 percent of social conflicts recorded targeted a government body; 11 percent were 
directed to private actors.  
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nationalization, and despite increased social and infrastructure spending. In 2010, CERES 
reported 811 social conflicts in Bolivia, the highest number recorded since the group 
started collecting data in 1970.28 Quoted in an article with BBC Mundo, Laserna noted 
the conflicts generally were over the distribution of natural resource rents (Vaca, 2011). 
Considering the rising public pressure to redistribute resource wealth yet limited revenue 
streams, the government is pushed to continue expanding natural gas development to 
meet expectations.  
Expanding resource development has come into conflict with Morales’ own 
political base, most notably in the department of La Paz. Due to its large population, 31.8 
percent of the Renta Dignidad recipients live in the department of La Paz (Viceministerio 
de Pensiones y Servicios Financieros , 2012). Similarly, La Paz has the second largest 
number of recipients of BJP, next to the department of Santa Cruz. Due to its large 
population, La Paz department benefits more on average from these social programs 
funded by natural resource wealth than others in the country. Because of the IDH’s bias 
toward gas-producing and sparsely populated departments, however, La Paz receives the 
lowest redistribution of hydrocarbon revenues per capita at $2729 (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 
2008).   
The department’s high consumption of social programs and low amount of per 
capita IDH revenue has contributed to the need for new exploration and development of 
natural gas fields in the department’s northern Amazonian region. García Linera 
trumpeted the development as a means to “reorganize the economic landscape” of 
Bolivia, expanding natural gas development into western departments (Translation mine, 
EFE, 2008). Resource extraction’s central role in the MAS’ economic plan, however, has 
                                                
28 Another explanation for this increasing number of conflicts is the active participatory democracy 
encouraged by the Morales administration. Social movements have an influential role in shaping policy 
within the MAS and Morales responds readily to demands from these civil actor (see Roberts, 2007; 
Madrid, 2008; Laserna, 2008).  
29 This is also a result of the department’s larger population and therefore thinner spread of IDH benefits. 
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led the government to prioritize industrial development over environmental and 
indigenous concerns (Guachalla, 2010).  
Confronting the MAS’ centralized approach to resource control, there are also 
ethnic/indigenous and departmental forces seeking localized control over resources. 
These efforts mobilize regional and ethnic identities to capture greater control over gas 
rents. Environmental and indigenous groups protesting gas extraction or demanding 
greater control over the resources found in the Amazon have been attacked as anti-
development by the Morales administration. When faced with accusations that the 
government was not complying with free informed prior consent (FIPC) procedures 
during gas exploration by the Petroandina joint venture, García Linera accused U.S.- and 
European-funded non-governmental organizations of manipulating indigenous groups to 
drum up environmental concerns to stop the project (YPFB, 2011). Framing the debate 
over expanded natural gas exploration in the Amazon as a zero-sum game, Morales 
asserted that the choice was between social programs like BJP and Renta Dignidad, and 
poverty: “if some NGOs say ‘no oil drilling in the Amazon’ […] they’re saying, in other 
words, that the Bolivian people have no money, that there’s no IDH, no royalties, but 
they’re also saying that there’s no (Bono) Juancito Pinto nor Renta Dignidad nor the 
Bono Juana Azurduy” (Translation mine, quoted in Guachalla, 2010). Morales used 
similar rhetoric to demonize opposition candidates in 2009, but here he implements the 
same strategy against indigenous groups for threatening the source of universal social 
policy.   
Indigenous concerns over gas development are not unique to La Paz. Before 
Morales’ election, during the Gas War, indigenous opinions on the development of gas in 
the department of Tarija were never considered in the national debate over how Bolivia’s 
gas reserves should be developed (Perreault, 2006). Since then, the social costs facing 
traditional cultures in the Tarijeño gas fields have been well documented (Gustafson, 
2009; Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010; Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). In an almost 
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unbelievable statement from Morales’ administration, José Magela, president of the 
Bolivian Board of Hydrocarbons, said oil companies were victims of extortion by groups 
of Guaraní indians blocking development in the southern Chaco region, where Tarija is 
located (La Razón, 2009). Natural gas’ status as a strategic resource, fueling the MAS’ 
social and political agenda, clashes with the Constitution’s aim to extend meaningful 
FIPC rights to peasant and indigenous groups. The conflict isolates protesting indigenous 
folks from the MAS nationalist project.  
Departmental autonomy movements also sought greater control over their 
region’s rents to the detriment of national solidarity. Debates over the control of natural 
resource rents in the Media Luna were influential in crafting regional identities to 
legitimate autonomy movements (Eaton, 2007; Vacaflores & Lizárraga, 2005; 
Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). The divisive repercussions of rent seeking for national 
solidarity are perhaps best seen in the southern department of Tarija. Tarija has long been 
a frontier department connected to extractive industries. Its distance from the political 
centers of Bolivia, La Paz and Santa Cruz, forced Tarijeño leaders to fight for financial 
support and recognition from the central government before the discovery of natural gas 
(Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010).  
Today, Tarija produces the vast majority of Bolivia’s natural gas and the 
department benefits heartily from its IDH transfer. In the time between the year the IDH 
began, 2005, and 2007, before major protests in 2008 broke out over autonomy, 89 
percent of Tarija’s budget depended on hydrocarbon revenues (CEDLA, 2008). Facing 
the MAS government’s attempt to centralize natural resource rents, opposition elites 
successfully mobilized large-scale support for the autonomy vote on the basis of 
recapturing hydrocarbon tax revenues. Opposition leaders argued that these revenues 
could be used instead for improving social services and infrastructure across the 
department. In July 2006, 60 percent of Tarijeños voted “yes” on the autonomy 
referendum (Bebbington & Bebbington, 2010). Eaton (2007) writes that Santa Cruz elites 
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similarly sought to craft a regional identity based around prefecture control of natural 
resources.  
The promise of hydrocarbon rents in the Media Luna was so great that elite 
business interests were able to mobilize large sections of the urban and rural populations 
in the name of recovering hydrocarbon rents from the central government. Eaton (2007) 
points out that, despite the opposition’s ability to attract non-elite voters, the rent-oriented 
identity crafted by the Media Luna would likely have little impact on their lives, 
reinforcing the divide between the haves and have-nots. Framing the debate over 
hydrocarbons regionally, elites were able to sidestep the thorny issue of class during the 
autonomy debates (Vacaflores & Lizárraga, 2005). Attempts to maximize rents from 
hydrocarbons motivated business elites in the Media Luna to craft regionally focused 
identities to help insulate themselves from the MAS’ national development project.  
Ultimately, these conflicts with indigenous groups and prefectures are based on 
the continued extractive pattern of development. The government has taken two steps 
forward, regaining national sovereignty over its natural resources and redistributing its 
profits for the country’s development but the persistence of the extractive pattern of 
development takes the government a step backwards, inflaming regional conflicts to the 
detriment of national solidarity. Natural gas is a bridge to a more diverse, inclusive 
economy, not an end in itself. Uruguayan economist Eduardo Gudynas notes “the 
emphasis granted to cash transfers as a synonym for social justice reduces the wide and 
diverse field of justice to a single dimension (redistributive economic justice)” 
(Translation mine, ERBOL, 2012). Universal social policy has a long history of building 
national solidarity but a more inclusive, stable economy will likely do more for bringing 




Chapter 6. Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis was to move the discussion of social policy beyond a 
narrow issue-based focus and toward a better understanding of its political potential. 
Looking at the case of post-neoliberal Bolivia, it examined the Morales administration’s 
decision to redistribute nationalized resource rents through universal social policy. 
Specifically, I investigated how universalism was leveraged for specific political goals: 
coalition building, nation building, and securing the support of the armed forces. Finally, 
the discussion turned to the rentier model that the Morales administration depends on to 
fund universal social policy and how it exacerbates ethnic and regional conflicts. 
Evidence from surveys, key informant interviews, reports, and official documents 
demonstrated that universal social policy was motivated by more than the goal to provide 
an efficient solution to the country’s chronic social inequality and education 
infrastructure. The Morales administration’s decision to implement universal social 
policy was a conscious effort to leverage windfall resource rents to build greater national 
solidarity and advance the MAS’ political project to refound the country.  
The Bolivian case is especially pertinent for expanding existing social policy 
theory. A country with deep ethnic, regional, and economic differences, Bolivia is a 
strong case to examine the political potential of universal social policy. Following the 
example of socialist governments in Western Europe, the MAS government used a 
universal model of redistribution to create a common bond across regional, class, and 
ethnic lines, and indirectly reward its working-class political base. The MAS’ marriage of 
citizenship and natural resources envisioned in the NDP was incarnated through universal 
social policy, tying diverse groups together to forge a shared identity. The result showed 
that social policy plays an important political role in the developing world. The Bolivian 
case is more than an echo of previous studies of national social policy: it expands the 
field into the uses of social policy in plurinational states. In the midst of nation-wide 
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efforts to decentralize many aspects of the Bolivian government and encourage an 
equality of cultural identities, the Morales administration maintains a hold on the 
country’s strategic sectors of the economy. In the face of a political project that radically 
redefines the nation and could arguably dissolve the State, the central government uses 
resource-funded universal social policy to define Bolivian citizenship through mutual 
benefit of natural resources, holding together this loose coalition of disparate identities.  
Along with its political contribution to nation building, universal social policy 
was instrumental in helping the Morales government consolidate political hegemony. 
Universalism allowed the administration to quickly implement BJP and Renta Dignidad 
without expensive upfront targeting studies and laborious compliance assessments. 
Impact studies show that despite the lack of targeting, universal cash transfers still reach 
the poorest Bolivians, assisting those with the most need while indirectly rewarding the 
party’s political base. The effort resonated with voters. Surveys demonstrated that cash 
transfers were consistently listed as one of the top reasons—even over nationalization—
why voters supported Morales (Asociación Boliviana de Ciencia Política, 2012; Ipsos 
APOYO, 2011; Ipsos APOYO, 2009).  
Perhaps the most interesting result of universal social policy in Bolivia, especially 
BJP, was its ability to gain a strong base of support in the locus of the opposition-led 
autonomy movement, Santa Cruz. While support for Morales in this opposition 
stronghold remains low compared to Andean departments, universal distribution allowed 
resources to flow to the most populous sections of Bolivia without regard for their 
political position. Paired with statistics that show increased national pride, and 
consistently high support for central government involvement in social and economic 
issues, universal social policy is shown to unite diverse, autonomy-minded territories to 
the wider nation. Surveys reviewed did not include information on how other Media Luna 
departments felt about BJP and Renta Dignidad, but general support for the MAS and 
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Morales has increased in Beni and Tarija; the MAS even won the prefecture governorship 
in Pando in 2010, controlling six of the nine prefectures.   
These surveys support my argument that the vehicles of redistribution—universal 
social policy—resonate more with people than the abstract notion of state control of 
strategic resources. Too often cash transfers have been glossed over as a supplement to 
the MAS political project instead of the key role it plays in the effort to refound the 
nation as described in the NDP. The studies and surveys on the process of nationalization 
and rent maximization squeeze out room for debate over the relationship between 
resources and citizenship in post-neoliberal Bolivia. The effect is seen in the way many 
surveys do not include cash transfers in their questionnaires. During the research phase of 
this thesis, it was difficult to find resources that addressed cash transfers as a reason for 
supporting Morales or the MAS. While academic assessments of Morales’ term in office 
focus on large-scale changes, there is little research into how everyday people receiving 
these cash transfers feel about them and their relationship to the government.30 “People 
on the ground don’t have a good sense about the policy [that funds cash transfers],” Gray 
Molina (personal communication, July 11, 2012) said in an interview, “they’re looking at 
what’s better than yesterday.” Gray Molina’s comment illustrates the need for more 
studies that focus on recipient perceptions of cash transfers while acknowledging their 
central part of the MAS government’s agenda.    
Besides using universal social policy to garner more support from the Media Luna 
region, Morales’ administration used the financing of Renta Dignidad to undercut the 
opposition. Taking advantage of the IDH’s preference for gas-producing departments, 
prefectures in Santa Cruz and Tarija used their hydrocarbon royalties to develop local 
infrastructure and social programs that competed with the central government’s universal 
social policy. The generosity of the prefectures’ social assistance played a role in the elite 
                                                
30 Vaughan (2010) is a notable exception.  
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opposition’s attempts to lure loyalty from residents by creating local stakeholders in high 
IDH transfers and the administrations that guaranteed them. By forcing prefectures to pay 
for the central government’s social policy, the MAS government limited the opposition’s 
access to resource revenues, reducing their ability to court regional loyalties through 
social policy. Even at the height of tensions over the autonomy debate, a majority of 
Bolivians identified with the nation over their region. Strong support for the central 
government to solve social and economic problems paired with growing calls for 
autonomy show that backing the MAS national agenda and decentralization are not 
mutually exclusive. Continued support for the central government in these areas suggests 
that universal social policy serves to unite the public behind the national government.  
Perhaps the most inventive political use of social policy by the Morales 
administration has been securing the support of the armed forces. Past studies (Rochlin, 
2007; Kohl, Bolivia under Morales: A Work in Progress, 2010) rightfully note that 
increased funding for the military has helped buy the loyalty of the institution but little is 
made of the armed forces’ role in administering social policy. Given the central 
government’s weak bureaucracy, the military was the practical choice to distribute cash 
transfers, especially in sparsely populated rural areas. Beyond practicality, however, the 
military’s involvement in social policy helped reorient the institution’s raison d’être. The 
MAS’ nationalism resonates with the armed forces and its iconic role in seizing natural 
gas fields helped demonstrate that the military would have a prominent role in Morales’ 
government. The NDP outlines a greatly expanded role for the military, from defending 
the nation’s natural resources to actively supporting its social and economic development. 
Statements from military leadership suggest that the institution views its “completely 
distinct new role” positively. Whether or not the military’s increasing comfort with the 
MAS will lead to future troubles is yet to be seen.  
Another critical part of Bolivia’s new cash transfers is the rentier model that funds 
them. Previous studies of social policy and nation building often ignore where the money 
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comes from to fund these programs. In the West, developed economies rely on a stable 
tax base to fund government social programs.31 Bolivia, however, is highly dependent on 
a small number of large corporations and its natural resource wealth to buoy its annual 
budget. Furthermore, the MAS’ nationalist project specifically associates (and funds) BJP 
and Renta Dignidad with resource nationalism. While the October Agenda proved to be 
an effective ideology to build solidarity around the shared benefit of nationalized 
resources, the effects of a rentier economy are starting to fray the coalition that the MAS 
government sought to sow together with universal social policy.  
Research presented by Laserna (2010) shows that social conflict has been steadily 
rising in Bolivia since the early 2000s, when the first large natural gas fields were found. 
These conflicts involve ethnic/indigenous groups seeking greater control over the 
development of resources in their territory and those seeking to maximize their own cut 
of rents. Some (Wolff, 2012) have argued that the Morales government, due to its close 
connections with social movements, actively encourages protest as a means to pursue 
MAS political goals through direct democracy. Moseley & Moreno (2010, p. 4) suggest, 
“protest participation has been absorbed almost completely into the conventional 
‘repertoire’ in Bolivia.” While protest might be a more acceptable political strategy in 
Bolivia, these arguments do little to answer why Bolivians are turning out in record 
numbers. Laserna’s point that most mobilizations were over resource allocations suggests 
that the rentier system incentivizes aggressive public action. And nationalizations 
continue. Six years to the day Morales announced the nationalization of the natural gas 
fields, the government ordered the military to seize the local assets of the Spanish 
company responsible for a large part of Bolivia’s electrical grid, Transportadora de 
Electricidad, (Minder, 2012). In the summer of 2012, Morales’ government nationalized 
                                                
31 Norway is the famous counter example. The Scandinavian country has successfully avoided the resource 
curse by forgoing royalty payments in favor of a system that taxes producer profits and draws on dividends 
from state-run oil and gas companies.  
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a tin and zinc mine operated by Glencore International, Inc., and the Canadian-run Malku 
Khota silver mine following protest from local indigenous groups (Jordan, 2012). Along 
with rising conflicts over the development and allocation of natural resources, protracted 
social conflicts continue to mire the MAS in a tension-filled relationship with its own 
base. Morales’ political capital was severely reduced by the botched gasolinazo and 
police violence against TIPNIS marchers.32 The government’s response seems to be 
expanding the cash transfer system. Morales’ administration launched a conditional cash 
transfer for pregnant mothers, Bono Juana Azurduy in 2009. In March 2012, Morales 
gave a speech on the International Women’s Day calling for a cash transfer for single 
mothers (Calle, 2012). In July 2012, García Linera announced yet another, the Bono 
Solidaria, a cash transfer for severely handicapped Bolivians (Rojas, 2012).  
Jaime Pérez (personal communication, July 6, 2011) of Fundación Jubileo opined 
that cash transfers were very successful at the beginning but that their political efficacy 
could be waning. Pérez compared the transfers to Band-Aids, short-term solutions for 
deeply rooted problems. Several subjects interviewed agreed, noting that cash transfers 
were not the same thing as addressing structural poverty in Bolivia (J. C. Guzmán, 
personal communication, June 29, 2011; F. Wanderley, personal communication, July 4, 
2011; R. Martínez, personal communication, July 6, 2011; L. Mokrani, personal 
communication, July 6, 2011). Many interviewed questioned whether or not the MAS 
government has any intention of moving past the current cash transfer approach to social 
inequality and poverty reduction, noting that the material means of many Bolivians have 
not improved in the last six years.33  
Defenders of Morales would surely counter (and perhaps rightly so) that the 
project proposed by the MAS is nothing short of herculean and that results should not be 
                                                
32 At this writing, the conflict is on going.  
33 Remember, there are no official statistics showing a decline in poverty since 2007. Even if government 
estimates are correct, a majority of Bolivians are still living in either moderate of severe poverty.  
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judged so quickly. Admittedly, the NDP acknowledges that direct redistribution is the 
first step, not the only, toward refounding the nation. Bolivia is in a difficult position: by 
trying to move past a raw-material export model the government depends even more so 
on extracting its natural resource wealth to guarantee economic growth and provide social 
safety nets.34 If the economy continues to concentrate on extractive industries, however, 
and not diversify to meet the material needs of the population, the problems that drive 
rent seeking and demand for cash transfers will persist along with social conflicts. In the 
face of expanding demands from the public, the question will be whether or not universal 
social policy will be able to continue playing a unifying role in the country or if the 
tensions generated by the rentier model drive the nation toward even greater 
fragmentation.  
The experience of BJP and Renta Dignidad offers an opportunity to expand the 
way future studies approach cash transfers beyond Bolivia. The number of these transfers 
has exploded around the world over the last decade, growing from three in 1997 to 30 in 
2008 (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). Eighteen of these programs are in Latin America. Past 
study of cash transfers has focused on cost-benefit analyses and whether or not they 
successfully address their program goals. The proliferation of cash transfers around the 
world makes the study of their political dimensions urgent. The Bolivian case of 
universal eligibility illustrates how cash transfers can be implemented for purposes 
beyond social issues and clientelism toward larger, more ideological and political projects 
like nation building. If social policy is used like this in Bolivia, it reasons that other 
countries also leverage national cash transfers for political purposes. Additional research 
would benefit the study of social policy in Latin America, where the greatest 
concentration of these programs exists, and offer a new perspective on universal cash 
transfers in other countries around the world. 
                                                
34 Doing justice to this dilemma alone would require another thesis (if not a book). Indeed, it would be the 
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